Since 1939 the Soviet leadership conducted a convoluted dance to correctly present its engagement with the Nazi Third Reich. If you know the detailed history of that period, you could think it's an impossible task – the facts are:

• In 1939 USSR and Third Reich entered the Ribbentropp-Molotov pact which was called a “non-aggression pact” but in reality the legal text codified not only partition of Poland between the two parties (a very “non-aggressive” step, indeed) but also far fetching “security” and “commercial” cooperation
• The “security” part was literally a cooperation agreement between NKVD and Gestapo targeted at, among others, joint propaganda efforts and countering any resistance on the occupied territories. As part of this agreement the USSR kindly returned German communists and Jews, whom it accepted as refugees in 1930's, back into hands of Gestapo
• The “commercial” part involved USSR supplying the Nazi Germany with millions of tons of fuel, food and industrial resources at a very difficult period when the Allies enforced economic blockade of Germany – thanks to USSR the Nazi Germany could continue its march through Europe and build up of its military power in preparation for the next target – the same USSR.

Of course, back in 1939-1941 all of the above quite logically placed the USSR among active allies of Nazi Germany, not merely neutral bystanders. Therefore, when on 1 May 1941 Soviets celebrated the International Workers' Day in Moscow, they had a group of prominent guests – the Nazi officials shaking hands of proud Soviet generals:

Then, on 22 June 1941 the Nazi Germany treacherously attacked its ally, the Soviet Union and since that day – and only then – the Soviets stopped being allies and became enemies, subsequently entering the Allies and the anti-Nazi coalition. Russians even officially recognise this by using a private alias for the WW2 – they call it “Great Patriotic War” which started in 1941, not 1939 as everyone else thinks.

What happened during these two years is usually skipped in discussions in Russia, as if there was nothing. If you push, they may admit the Ribbentropp-Molotov pact was a fat, but highlight that it was a genius step by Stalin who expected the war and somehow delayed German invasion by pretending to be friends, allowing USSR to prepare. The part where USSR for two years literally armed and fueled Germany's war effort preparing invasion on USSR is conveniently skipped. Pushing Russians about this part somehow makes them angry and emotional.

There's one more important part here: during German invasion, hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens collaborated with Nazis, including both civilians and formation of 125'000 strong Russian Liberation Army, which fought along with Wehrmacht. This number, 125'000 Soviet citizens, mostly Russians who enlisted into German army, is important because later on Stalin deported whole ethnic groups for “collaboration”.

So thousands of Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Kalmyks were deported as a collective punishment for “collaborators” (counted in hundreds) – but Russians weren't, in spite of hundreds of thousands of collaborators among them. It's also important to keep in mind for the following legal debate...

Article 354.1 “Rehabilitation of Nazism”

In 2022 I have written a long article explaining the peculiar definition of “Nazism” in USSR and Putin's Russia. In short, it explains why and how Russian authorities convicted people who literally fought with Nazis of being “Nazis” themselves. The secret was simple: a twisted logic built on an axiom that because the USSR was the only only truly anti-Nazi country in the world, so automatically everyone who opposed USSR... must have been a Nazi! That was how it worked through all the period of 1945-1991 after which there was a brief period where lucky historians could access KGB archives and saw a glimpse of the Soviet war-time collaboration with Nazis and Soviet war crimes.

First thing Putin did in 1999 was to shut down this window and then extend the classification period of all Soviet WW2 archives. Why? The popular interpretation is that it was to hide the scale of Russian collaboration under Nazi occupation 1941-1943, and to hide the Soviet war crimes against its own population. The former is likely – none of the today's great Russian “patriots” wants to have their ancestors' names published as Nazi collaborators.

And in 2014 Russian Criminal Code also introduced an absolutely incredible regulation – the Аrticle 354.1 of the Criminal Code of Russian Federation.

The law has a peculiar wording, because it’s titled “Rehabilitation of Nazism” but nowhere in the actual legal text includes the term “Nazism”! Just to reiterate: the law called “rehabilitation of Nazism” doesn't legally prohibit neither “rehabilitation” nor “Nazism” in its legal text! So what does it ban?

In this case the Russian lawmakers really tortured the wording of this law:

Denial of facts established by the judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis Countries, approval of crimes established by the said judgment, as well as the dissemination of deliberately false information about the activities of the USSR during the Second World War and about veterans of the Great Patriotic War, committed publicly.

Let's dissect this convoluted single (!) sentence:

• “denial of facts established...” – reference to the Nurember trials where Nazi leaders were convicted of numerous war crimes, which at the same time serves as justification for the Soviet actions during WW2 (see below...). Whatever Soviets did, says the Russian legislator, was “approved” at Nuremberg because it was Germans who were judged there, not USSR.
• The above requires some clarification: for example, in Nuremberg the Soviet delegation attempted to add the Katyn massacre conducted by NKVD in 1940 as “Nazi war crime”, presenting fabricated evidence. The Tribunal dismissed it as unproven, thus acquitting Germans of this particular war crime... but did not name the actual perpetrator! Therefore, according to this legal text, Russia can pursue people attributing this massacre to USSR, even though Russian authorities themselves admitted it in 1991 and 2010. After all, USSR was not named as perpetrator in Nuremberg which serves as the key reference here!
• “the activities of the USSR during the Second World War and about veterans of the Great Patriotic War” – this is a very curious example of intentionally obscured wording: Russian historiography clearly distinguishes the “Great Patriotic War” – the period of WW2 from 1941-1945 that is after USSR was invaded by its ally – from the actual WW2 1939-1945, as recognised by most countries. In Russia, the term “Second World War” is used rarely and reluctantly, for reasons clearly explained at the start of this article.

Thanks to this carefully crafted wording and courts practice of stretching it to suit political orders, it is now illegal to discuss the Soviet-Nazi cooperation or Soviet war crimes. Russian citizens are actually being sentenced based on this law.

The law also distinguishes between the “two wars”, that is WW2 and GPW covering different periods, “activities of the USSR during WW2”, which includes invasion on Poland, Finland or Katyn massacres (1940) – all of which can be prosecuted – and “veterans of the Great Patriotic War” (from 1941), because, apparently, since USSR did not participate in any war in 1939 so there couldn’t be any “veterans”?

And now about the law's title – why refer to “Nazism” if it's not even mentioned in the legal text? It's a clever black PR trick that serves as an additional pressure point for the accused. The general public reading FSB press announcements learns merely that the perpetrators were sentenced for “Rehabilitation of Nazism” – because that's how the law is titled – regardless of what they actually said or have done! So displaying the above 1 May 1941 parade on your social media in Russia accompanied by a clear condemnation of Nazism will get your convicted for... “rehabilitation” of the very Nazism you have just condemned.

And that's the core of the Soviet and now Russian system of statewide gaslighting, which will twist your own words into something completely opposite and ultimately convince everyone that you have said the very opposite of what you did.

P.S. it's a cruel irony that the preceding item in the Russian Criminal Code, article 354, makes it a crime to “incite, start and conduct an aggressive war” which is all Russia has been doing 2014-2025, but I will write about it more next time.

— Paweł Krawczyk https://krvtz.net/ Fediverse @kravietz@agora.echelon.pl

Since 1939 the Soviet leadership conducted a convoluted dance to correctly present its engagement with the Nazi Third Reich. If you know the detailed history of that period, you could think it's an impossible task – the facts are:

• In 1939 USSR and Third Reich entered the Ribbentropp-Molotov pact which was called a “non-aggression pact” but in reality the legal text codified not only partition of Poland between the two parties (a very “non-aggressive” step, indeed) but also far fetching “security” and “commercial” cooperation
• The “security” part was literally a cooperation agreement between NKVD and Gestapo targeted at, among others, joint propaganda efforts and countering any resistance on the occupied territories. As part of this agreement NKVD kindly returned German communists and Jews whom it accepted as refugees in 1930's back into hands of Gestapo
• The “commercial” part involved USSR supplying the Nazi Germany with millions of tons of fuel, food and industrial resources at a very difficult period when the Allies enforced economic blockade of Germany – thanks to USSR the Nazi Germany could continue its march through Europe and build up of its military power in preparation for the next target – the same USSR.

Of course, back in 1939-1941 all of the above quite logically placed the USSR among active allies of Nazi Germany, not merely neutral bystanders. Therefore, when on 1 May 1941 Soviets celebrated the International Workers' Day in Moscow, they had a group of prominent guests – the Nazi officials shaking hands of proud Soviet generals:

Then, on 22 June 1941 the Nazi Germany treacherously attacked its ally, the Soviet Union and since that day – and only then – the Soviets stopped being allies and became enemies, subsequently entering the Allies and the anti-Nazi coalition. Russians even officially recognise this by calling what most of the world calls World War II with their own alias – “Great Patriotic War” and marking its start in 1941, not 1939. What happened during these two years is usually skipped, as if nothing happened. If you push, they may admit the Ribbentropp-Molotov pact but highlight that it was a genius step by Stalin who expected the war and somehow delayed German invasion by pretending to be friends, allowing USSR to prepare. The part where USSR for two years literally armed and fueled Germany's war effort is conveniently skipped here.

There's one more important part here: during German invasion, hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens collaborated with Nazis, including both civilians and formation of 125'000 strong Russian Liberation Army, which fought along with Wehrmacht. This number, 125'000 Soviet citizens, mostly Russians, who enlisted into German army, is important because later on Stalin deported whole ethnic groups for collaboration. So Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Kalmyks were deported for a few thousands of collaborators in total – but Russians weren't in spite of hundreds of thousands of collaborators among them.

Article 354.1 “Rehabilitation of Nazism”

In 2022 I have written a long article explaining the peculiar definition of “Nazism” in USSR and Putin's Russia. In short, it explains why and how Russian authorities convicted people who literally fought with Nazis of being “Nazis” themselves. The secret was simple: a twisted logic built on an axiom that because the USSR was the only only truly anti-Nazi country in the world, so automatically everyone who opposed USSR... must have been a Nazi! That was how it worked through all the period of 1945-1991 after which there was a brief period where lucky historians could access KGB archives and talk openly about the full scale of Soviet collaboration with Nazis and Soviet war crimes. First thing Putin did in 1999 was to shut down this window and then extend the classification period of all Soviet WW2 archives.

Since 2014 Russian Criminal Code also introduced Аrticle 354.1 of the Criminal Code of Russian Federation.

The article has interesting wording, because it’s titled “Rehabilitation of Nazism” but nowhere in the actual legal text includes the word “Nazism”! Just to reiterate: the law referring to “rehabilitation of Nazism” doesn't legally prohibit neither “rehabilitation” nor “Nazism” in its legal text! So what does it ban?

In this case the Russian lawmakers really tortured the wording of this law:

Denial of facts established by the judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis Countries, approval of crimes established by the said judgment, as well as the dissemination of deliberately false information about the activities of the USSR during the Second World War and about veterans of the Great Patriotic War, committed publicly.

Let's dissect this convoluted sentence:

• “denial of facts established...” – reference to the Nurember trials where Nazi leaders were convicted of numerous war crimes, which at the same time serves as justification for the Soviet actions during WW2 (see below...). Whatever Soviets did, says the Russian legislator, was “approved” at Nuremberg because it was Germans who were judged there, not us.
• The above requires some clarification: in Nuremberg the Soviet delegation attempted to add the Katyn massacre conducted by NKVD in 1940 as “Nazi war crime”, presenting fabricated evidence. The Tribunal dismissed it as unproven, thus acquitting Germans of this particular war crime... but did not name the actual perpetrators! Therefore, according to this legal text, Russia can pursue people attributing this massacre to USSR, even though Russian authorities themselves admitted it in 1991 and 2010. After all, USSR was not named as perpetrator in Nuremberg which serves as the key reference here!
• “the activities of the USSR during the Second World War and about veterans of the Great Patriotic War” – this is a very curious example of convoluted wording here, because Russian historiography clearly distinguishes the “Great Patriotic War” – the period of WW2 from 1941-1945 that is after USSR was invaded by its ally – from the actual WW2 1939-1945, as used by most countries. In Russia, the term “Second World War” is used rarely and reluctantly, for reasons clearly explained at the start of this article.

Thanks to this carefully crafted wording and courts stretching it to suit political orders, it is now in practice illegal to discuss the Soviet-Nazi cooperation or Soviet war crimes, and Russian citizens are actually being sentenced based on this law.

The law also distinguishes between the “two wars”, that is WW2 and GPW covering different periods, “activities of the USSR during WW2”, which includes invasion on Poland, Finland or Katyn massacres (1940) – all of which can be prosecuted – and “veterans of the Great Patriotic War” (from 1941), because, apparently, since USSR did not participate in any war in 1939 so there couldn’t be any “veterans”?

And now about the law's title – why refer to “Nazism” if it's not even mentioned in the legal text? It just serves as an additional pressure point for the accused. For the general public reading FSB press announcements, the perpetrators were sentenced for “Rehabilitation of Nazism” – because that's how the law is titled – regardless of what they said or have done! So displaying the above 1 May 1941 parade on your social media in Russia accompanied by a clear condemnation of Nazism will get your convicted for... “rehabilitation” of the very Nazism you have condemned.

And that's the core of the Soviet and now Russian system of statewide gaslighting, which will twist your own words into something completely opposite and ultimately convince everyone that you have said the very opposite of what you did.

P.S. it's a cruel irony that the preceding item in the Russian Criminal Code, article 354, makes it a crime to “incite, start and conduct an aggressive war” which is all Russia has been doing 2014-2025, but I will write about it more next time.

— Paweł Krawczyk https://krvtz.net/ Fediverse @kravietz@agora.echelon.pl

In 2023 a complexity scientist Peter Turchin had published an Attrition Warfare Model for the war in Ukraine^1 which attempted to predict its outcome based on mathematical modeling.

Turchin is a scientist working in the area of complex systems. The latter had in the past gained some publicity as chaos theory – modeling systems so complex internally that their states are usually only described in statistical terms and their behaviour is described as “chaotical”, even when it really isn’t.

In 2020 Turchin made some fame when people dug up his 2010 prediction that in a decade US may be hit by a wave of large civil unrests. He came to this conclusion based on modeling a combination of numerous economic and social factors which seemed to converge to a state usually resulting in unrest.^2 Turchin later extended his theory which can be summarised as “workers stagnate while elites multiply” to the election of Trump, the MAGA movement and general wave of antidemocratic movements.^3

In 2023 Turchin also attempted to model the war started by Russia and his team created a mathematical model that includes economic (military industry output) and demographic parameters (number of soldiers).^1 The model has evolved over the last two years but the latest version is probably best described, including its limitations, by the 2023 article “Empirically Testing Predictions of an Attrition Warfare Model for the War in Ukraine”^4. I was surprised to see people like MacGregor and Ritter quoted there, but Turchin seems to use them as the proponents of the most possibly cynical scenario for the purpose of modeling. If you read the whole model description, which I encourage everyone to do, Turchin’s assumptions are quite impartial and as realistic as a simplified model can be.

The baseline scenario is quite pessimistic: to make the long story short, Russia has economy and population so large that it will simply not deplete before Ukraine’s does. That’s as cynical as it can be, and as a matter of fact this is the core argument Russians are always raising: they’re just too big to lose and therefore they always win. The original 2023 model predicted ~150k Russian losses and ~400k Ukrainian losses after 36 months of war, which was February 2025:

Please note the input parameters – casualty per shell, because it's key to understanding how such result was even possible. In short, the model assumes that both sides suffer equal casualty ratio, but because Russia fires much more shells and has more people, it wins.

Turchin also looks at alternative scenario where Ukraine’s economy (represented by ammunition production rate) is really equivalent to the whole EU and US, in which case the roles reverse.

The model in theory should not be interpreted as a real-world forecast, as clearly stated in the article’s disclaimer. But you really cannot avoid comparing it against the real world, because all the time it refers to actual numbers of real people in real countries (this was very much the same case with Club of Rome Limits to Growth model published in 1972).

When I first looked at the model in 2024, the primary issue I had was specifically the unrealistic prediction of losses. After two years of war (February 2024) the model predicted Ukraine’s losses to reach almost 300’000 while Russian were 3x less. This, if anything, was the opposite of real estimates. Three years into the war, as of 2025, the divergence is even larger.

The secret really lies in two factors: the number of shells fired (function of economy) and the “casualties per shot”, which is kind of arbitrary and set to 0.03 (30 shells fired kill one soldier). The number is, again, kind of estimated based on real Russian loses, but then, on page 8, Turchin wrote the key phrase “I set d2 = d1”. This statement essentially assumes that Russian losses per shell are the same as Ukrainian. Why? Because.

If you try to play with these parameters in the live model^1 you can actually get losses modelled closer to the real estimates^6. When setting the casualties per Ukrainian shell to 0.06 and Russian to 0.006 we will get ~120k Ukrainian casualties and ~250k Russian which are the latest conservative estimates of KIA.

Of course, this is just one parameter. The original 2023 model assumptions have many factual issues – for example, Russia's army size is not 200k, it's now closer to 600k while Ukraine's is close to 1m. These could be also modified in the respective recruitment tab if we had reliable estimates, which I don't.

All of the above model’s deficiencies are prominently mentioned by Turchin in the article. The primary Turchin’s conclusion from the model’s outputs seems to be that the critical condition for Ukraine’s victory is economical and industrial support of its allies. Also, in terms of model’s parameters, as Turchin himself notes, human losses suffer from very high uncertainty as both sides actively obscure them. At the same time, OSINT provides equipment losses which were in the past confirmed to cover up to 80% the actual losses, which could make the case for further improvement of the model’s output.

Personally, I believe the losses ratio is a critical parameter, because it's precisely what counterweights the popular Russian narrative that they're “doomed to win because they're larger”. Russia may indeed have population 4x larger than Ukraine but with losses at ratio 1:13 (confirmed armour losses) or 1:7 (declared by Ukraine) this advantage is going to diminish fast. Which clearly hints that any strategy that incurs such losses at Russia is preferable, which most likely implies a defensive strategy.

Another important thing to note here is the chart showing size of Ukraine's army – according to the model, with its original recruitment ratio and the above losses, it will continue to grow, increasing rather than decreasing Ukraine's military potential. You may not agree with the exact numbers, but it's empirically true and explains why Russia has invested enormous resources into information war targeting Ukraine's army mobilisation. If you have never heard of it, it's because you are not the target of it, but believe me – the Russian campaign to discredit mobilisation is very much visible in Ukraine. The same factor on Russian side explains its desperate measures to attract recruits without a countrywide official mobilisation.^5

— Paweł Krawczyk https://krvtz.net/ Fediverse @kravietz@agora.echelon.pl

As the new rounds of American negotiations with Russia are covered in the media in early 2025 with the great confusion regarding intentions of both sides, I decided to re-read the classic “Negotiating with the Russians” book from 1951. While most of the book covers very specific talks on specific now historic events, the last chapter “Soviet Techniques of Negotiation” is an attempt to produce a more general analysis, and I found a number of observations contained there still very relevant to today's negotiations.

About the very idea of a compromise in negotiations:

One the difficulties of Soviet-Russian vocabulary is that the word “compromise” is not of native origin and carries with it no favorable empathy. It is habitually used only in combination with the adjective “putrid.” Compromise for the sake of getting on with the job” is natural to American and British people, but it is alien to the Bolshevist way of thinking and to the discipline which the Communist Party has striven to inculcate in its members. To give up a demand once presented, even a very minor or formalistic point, makes a Bolshevik-trained negotiator feel that he is losing control of his own will and is becoming subject to an alien will. Therefore any point which has finally to be abandoned must be given up only after a most terrific struggle. The Soviet negotiator must first prove to himself and his superiors that he is up against an immovable force. Only then is he justified in abandoning a point which plainly cannot be gained and in moving on to the next item, which will again be debated in an equally bitter tug-of-wills.

About “agreement in principle”:

One main pitfalls in wartime Anglo-American negotiations with the Soviet Union was is tendency to rely upon reaching an “agreement 1n principle, without spelling out in sufficient detail all the steps in its execution. After long and strenuous debates, studded with charges, accusations and suspicions, it was undoubtedly a great relief to reach a somewhat generally worded agreement and to go home. Prodded by manifold public and party duties, anxious to prove to themselves and to their people that current agreements and postwar cooperation with the Soviet Government were genuinely possible, facing “deadlines” with respect to the expectations of legislatures and of public opinion, the western leaders often approached these negotiations under serious disadvantages. Wooed rather than the wooer, able to deal at leisure with the manipulation of their public opinion at home, facing no dead-lines, the Soviet leaders had many advantages. In this situation the western powers sometimes gained the “principle” of their hopes, only to find that “in practice” the Soviet government continued to pursue its original aims.

The authors give a concrete example, that of post-war Poland which, as we know today, became fully integrated into Soviet Eastern Bloc:

At Yalta the Soviet Government agreed, after very lengthy argument and stubborn resistance, to Participate in a reconstruction of the Polish Government which would, it appeared, permit the survival of some political freedom for the great non-Communist majority of the people. By delays and quibbling over the execution of the “agreement in principle” during the next few months, the Soviet Government secured about ninety percent of the original position with which it had come to Yalta and thus strengthened beyond challenge the small Communist minority in its dominant control of the country.

But that was not all – agreement “on paper” is one, reality “on the ground” is another. Following these negotiations. Russia aggressively pushed its goals, doing some pro-forma steps such as the falsified 1946 referendum and falsified 1947 elections. These events bear strong resemblance to the falsified referendums in Ukrainian Crimea and Donbas, which were – just as Poland's fate in 1946 – stamped de facto by Western inaction.

Another tactics used by Soviets that allowed them to put their foot into the door while at the same time don't letting themselves be blamed as those unwilling for talks was simply to send negotiators with no instructions.

In opening negotiations with any Soviet representatives except Stalin the first problem is to discover whether the representatives have any instructions at all. ‘To discover what those instructions, if any, are requires sitting out the whole course of the negotiation, with its demands, insults, and rigidities and its always uncertain outcome. (...) The usual experience with “uninstructed” Soviet delegations has been (...) after delivery by it of numerous charges and accusations, [it became clear] that the Soviet delegation had no instructions except to “report back”.

The authors give a concrete example of negotiations about reconstructions of railway network on the liberated territories (EITO), for which topic Moscow hasn't yet made its mind:

After several weeks of “negotiation” the American delegation came to the conclusion that the Soviet delegation was unable to present any proposals of its own or to accept any British or Amer ican proposals. On the other hand it was free to raise and repeat any number of criticisms of the other drafts, provided it did not allow itself to be pinned down to approval of any individual provision or textual wording. It was clear that the Soviet delegation had long since given up any effort to record in Russian or to transmit to its own government any of the numerous modified drafts which had been submitted by the other two delegations during the course of the negotiation. It was quite probable that the Soviet delegation had been hustled off to London with no proposals to present and with no detailed instructions except to report back. Once in London, its members were probably too timid to make any recommendations or even to ask for new instructions, and in Moscow the few people who were qualified to handle a question of this kind were too busy with matters of direct Soviet interest, such as transforming the Lublin Committee into the government of Poland or negotiating the Soviet terms for the armistice with Rumania, to bother their heads or Stalin’s head about EITO.

Here's not directly related but historically relevant mention of the propaganda technique that we currently see in Russian media quoting anonymous comments on social media (likely written by Russians themselves) and then selling them under titles such as “Britons outraged over their government's attitude to Russia”:

This does not mean that Moscow is cut off from the flow of public opinion materials from abroad. On the contrary, it probably receives a very large volume of material, especially clippings of all kinds. On occasion Andrei Vyshinsky quotes triumphantly from some small local newspaper or some relatively obscure “public figure’ to prove that the “‘ruling circles’ in the United States are hatching some “imperialist,” “war-mongering’’ plot. This practice arouses bewilderment or uneasy merriment in American listeners, whose ears are attuned to the cacophony of conflicting views. In the Soviet way of thinking, the citing of such sources is perfectly logical since it is assumed that nothing happens “accidentally” and therefore all expressions of opinion are of equal value in exposing the underlying pattern of hostile intention.

Authors also explained the peculiarity of Soviet negotiating traditions arising from the changed in diplomatic staff caused by the 1930's Great Purge:

The new foreign affairs staff was recruited among the middle ranks of Soviet officials, whose entire training had been based on rigid adherence to centralized decisions and who had rarely had informal contacts with life outside the Soviet Union. The present. day Soviet representative can hardly be called a “negotiator” in the customary sense. He is rather treated as a mechanical mouthpiece for views and demands formulated centrally in Moscow, and is deliberately isolated from the impact of views, interests and sentiments which influence foreign governments and peoples. Probably the Soviet representative abroad, through fear of being accused of “falling captive to imperialist and cosmopolitan influences,” serves as a block to the transmission of foreign views and sentiments, rather than as a channel for communicating them to his government.

— Paweł Krawczyk https://krvtz.net/ Fediverse @kravietz@agora.echelon.pl

“What goes on in Donbas?”, is the question heard most frequently from those who consistently watched this front line for the last months, while #Ukraine command keeps silence on both #Kursk and #Donbas directions. Interestingly, Ukrainian military channels and OSINT groups such as DeepState, who are usually very vocal when something goes actually wrong (e.g. general Sodol scandal), are now also silent which suggests they actually do understand what's going on.

Here's a collection of several analytical opinions trying to explain the Ukrainian tactics on both directions and respond to the popular criticism that it didn't make sense to send troops to Kursk and they should be instead used to reinforce Donbas garrison. Firstly, direct response to this criticism from Russian opposition “Volya” channel which had been providing extensive analytics from the beginning of the war. This has been published in a series of two posts on Telegram[^1][^2], which I have slightly edited for clarity:

Let's go in order. In the east and south-east the Russians are indeed advancing, but slowly and with very heavy losses (more than 35 thousand killed and wounded on average per month since June). They are taking villages, but not every day, and the depth and speed of the Russian advance is small, less than 3 kilometres per week in all directions except Pokrovskoye, Toretskoye and Chasov Yar. The Russians have a quantitative advantage, as well as an advantage in equipment and artillery. The AFU[^3] is slowly withdrawing almost everywhere. The battles in the east and south-east are really being fought with limited forces and the command does not allocate reserves, or hardly at all.

This is the situation as seen on the maps, now “Volya” goes on to explain the purpose of this gradual retreat tactics:

This is done because the forces that hold the front line do cope with the task at hand. And the task is to inflict maximum defeat on the enemy and withdraw when the situation becomes critical or close to critical. The main task of the AFU for the year 2024 (before the Kursk operation) was to destroy the maximum number of Russian soldiers and equipment, without acceptable losses. Holding destroyed villages and forest belts was not part of the task, because territory as such is not decisive. Defence and supply nodes are important, not any field or woodland.

In essence, “Volya” suggests that the experienced brigades holding the east front are executing a specific military objective and they execute it successfully, even if they suffer losses in its course. There's one more important aspect to the reinforcements and rotations as suggested by the people aside:

These are both old, experienced brigades and formations, and those who started fighting in the summer of 2023. The Ukrainian military, fighting in Chasovy Yar, near Kupyansk, Avdeevka, and now Toretskoye and Pokrovskoye, have repeatedly said roughly the same thing: untried or simply new units are not needed on the old sections of the front. Because the newcomers (even if they turn out to be experienced fighters) know worse the specific terrain and features of the front line in a particular section, because of this they will immediately increase losses. And not so much killed as wounded, and this is an additional burden on logistics and again losses. The help of reserves is needed to prepare new lines of defence in the near rear. This task was carried out (though often not by reserves, but by those who were brought to rest from the front line), thanks to which the Russians cannot move quickly. If Syrsky had thrown the same forces into the hottest – Pokrovskoye – direction as in Kursk Oblast, the Russians would not have stopped, and the ratio of losses from the current 1 to 2.5 in favour of the AFU would have changed to 1 to 1 or 2 to 1 in favour of the Russian Federation. Two failures of the Ukrainian defence (at Ocheretino and at Toretsk) happened precisely because brigades from the operational reserve were sent there.

Now let's make a digression and compare this against another geographic analysis that has been posted by an undisclosed Ukrainian channel (I found it on a Russian channel)[^4]

The speed of the enemy's advance from Avdiivka was due not only to the eight-month break in US assistance, but also to the complex geography in this direction. (...) This is a peculiarity of the Donetschyna event – compact “promuzyels” (Russian: industrial nodes) – small industrial towns surrounded by networks of villages in the suburbs, and behind/before that – voids. For example, between Novomikhailivka (Marinka agglomeration) and Kurakhiv there is 18 kilometres of emptiness. (...) Now the enemy has mostly passed the relatively ‘easy’ areas and has come to Grodovka, Karlovka and the Kazennyi Torets River (covering the Pokrovsk-Konstakha route from the south). (...) The invaders were left with the triangles Nevelskoye-Krasnogorovka-Hornyak, Krasnogorovka-Georgievka-Kurakhovka and the huge square Konstantinovka-Georgievka-Kurakhovka-Uspenovka. (...) In the future, the enemy will be forced to attack Novogrodovka and Toretsk itself head-on (partly this has already begun). Further there are Selidovo, Gornyak and Mirnograd. Only those who are not familiar with the situation can say that these nodes are not fortified. Hellacious battles are expected there. (...) Time is playing for us. The longer our soldiers hold the remnants of the same Nevelskoye – a village with an area of less than 1 square kilometre – the more time we have for further preparations. By the way, separate personal awards should be given for the defence of Nevelskoye. Because a village with actual dimensions of 950 by 750 metres (!) has been held for more than 1.5 years since the line of contact began to pass nearby.

The comment, even if poorly sources, it quite detailed and it almost perfectly matches the analysis by “Volya”, to which we now return. In summary, throwing the precious reserves to Donbas would not stop the Russian offensive there on tactical level, but it would also not solve any strategic problems (Russians having an initiative and choosing where to attack next):

The saturation of the front line with men and armoured vehicles does not give the AFU any advantage at this stage of the war. This is the Russian way of fighting, which is due to the low level of training of the personnel, poor communication and poor training of the command staff. There is no need to repeat after the Russian army. In the summer of 2023 they already did this in the south, afraid to implement the original plan because of the probable high losses. As a result, they lost the same number of casualties, did not solve any problems and lost the initiative.

Now, about the reserves that were used for the Kursk operation:

In the Kursk operation involved not even one-fifth of the Ukrainian reserves. And so far they are successfully coping with their tasks. Losses, according to Ukrainian officers, are lower than expected before the offensive. It is clear that the situation with losses may change, but so far it is exactly like this. That is, the operation in Kursk region was allocated the number of troops that could solve the task, but their loss would not be a disaster for the entire army and the front.

Unlike the last year's largely failed offensive, Kursk was planned much more wisely and used as an opportunity to mix newly formed units with very experienced ones:

In the Kursk region, along with experienced brigades, they sent units that had just completed six-month and four-month training. And this is the right step. Because a new section of the front is new for both the attackers and the defence. The lack of combat experience is compensated for by competent officers, overall coordination and operational management, tactics and modern equipment. Such operations are hardly the best, cynical as it may sound, way for fresh units to gain combat experience. This is what we are witnessing now in the Kursk region.

Now, what does the Kursk operation achieve?

What is the benefit of the operation in Kursk region for the AFU in the east and south-east and how much will it affect the further course of combat operations and the war in general? Russians are forced to withdraw units from the front. From the east, south-east and south. Only the Pokrovskoye, Toretskoye and Kramatorsk directions (i.e. Chasov Yar, Kleshcheevka, Andreevka, Kurdyumovka) are not touched. The Russian grouping began to have problems with a shortage of equipment, which now has to be sent to a new section of the front instead of the old familiar ones. To somehow rectify the situation in the moment, the Russian Federation turned to Lukashenko for tanks and armoured vehicles.

Now some very specific quantitative estimates for Russian side:

The shortage of personnel is also acute. Reinforcements from new contract workers and mobilised instead of the occupied territories are now going to the Kursk region. There is an urgent need to cover the entire border with Ukraine with troops, artillery, aviation and armoured vehicles. The length of the border from the Bryansk region to Belgorod region near Volchansk is almost 500 kilometres, and this does not take into account the 47 kilometre stretch in the Kursk region, which is now controlled by the AFU. To understand, to reliably cover the 160 kilometre front in the Zaporozhye region in 2023, the AFU needed almost 170 thousand people. The border, of course, is not a front, but for confident control over it you need at least 20 thousand people with equipment and artillery for 100 kilometres of the border in the first echelon and at least 5-7 thousand for the same section, deployed in a 20-30 kilometre zone and divided into large mobile groups that can quickly move to the place of breakthrough. This is 125-135 thousand people, well equipped and provided with transport, communications, engineering machines for building fortifications and much more. The Russian Federation simply does not have such a number of troops and will not have them without mobilisation. But the border must be closed. Therefore, to fulfil this task they will send conscripts (minus those who have already been sent to Kursk region) and those who will be pulled from ‘quiet’ parts of the front: Kherson and Zaporozhye regions. The result will be 55-65 thousand people, poorly equipped, with inexperienced officers, scattered over unknown territory, which they will not be able to cover reliably anyway.

And now we start to see the shapes of the possible strategic plan:

These are [the Russian] forces that could have been in the east and south-east, but now will not be there. These are those who were already in the east and south-east but are not there now. These are the ones who will be taken off the front in the next two or three weeks, as more soldiers will be needed in Kursk and the border region. The Russians will still be bursting forward on their main sections of the front. But this troop transfer will allow the AFU to strike again where the Russian defence will be weakened or where the Russians are rushing forward without taking care of the rear. And there will be nothing to stop such a strike, if it happens. The Kursk operation is not an end in itself, but a step towards the next goal.

That's “Volya”. This analysis is extensive and logically consistent, but of course it doesn't provide any evidence basis. Is there anything else that could support it? Incidentally, the next day “Volya” posted their second analysis, an Ukrainian “Govorit snayper” channel posted[^5] the following comment, clearly responding to the same “what about Donbas” concern:

In the Pokrovsk sector, our troops are exhausted, being terrorised by air for days on end and then outnumbered 10 to 1 by infantry. In addition, the enemy's infantry, which is really well-trained for combat, is fighting there, attacking from 4-5:00 to 21:00 every day. Under such pressure, there's only two options: 1) stand to the death, 2) Gradually retreat with the fight up to the prepared defence lines, allowing the ‘big brothers’ to kill as many Russians as possible.

That is a quite objective description of the situation for AFU forces in Donbas, consistent with “Volya” analysis. But then he writes the following:

The initiative on the battlefield can change hands at any time, so it's too early to ‘surrender’ Myrnohrad and Pokrovsk on the Internet. The defence line there was being prepared, and its reliability can only be tested in combat. I hope for the best, prepare for the worst, and help the soldiers as much as I can. I advise you to do the same.

And I will leave it here, with not further comments.

Footnotes:

• [^1]: https://t.me/volyamedia/1053
• [^2]: https://t.me/volyamedia/1054
• [^3]: AFU – Armed Forces of Ukraine
• [^4]: https://t.me/DonbassYasinovatayanaliniiOgnia/55133
• [^5]: https://t.me/Airborne1126/16791

— Paweł Krawczyk https://krvtz.net/ Fediverse @kravietz@agora.echelon.pl

I have recently stumbled upon quite a recent book, “The Oxford Handbook of Karl Marx”, which is yet another modern attempt to explain #Marxism to people who try to “read Marx” due to his “continued” or even “increased relevance” in the face of imminent “collapse of the world capitalism”.

Why do you need “handbooks” and “companions” for a 19th century theory claimed to be “as relevant as ever”? “The Oxford Handbook” admits:

For those wishing to better understand Marx’s work, the historical debates and traditions within Marxism, and the range of ways in which Marxist theory is being used for social science today, finding a point of entry can be daunting.

Maybe it's only the Oxford team who experiences some perceptive difficulties when reading Marx? But no, another popular handbook “A Companion To Marx's Capital” by David Harvey lulls the newbies through the “cryptic” passages only to eventually insist on just taking them as granted:

Marx here lays out fundamental categories in an a priori and somewhat cryptic, take-it-or-leave-it fashion that could do with elaboration. But I am also interested in getting you, as quickly as possible, familiar with the kind of close reading of Capital that is necessary if you are to understand it. Don’t worry, I will not continue at this level of intensity!

Harvey in his book uses the word “cryptic” exactly ten times and it's always about Marx assertions (“a mere four pages of rather cryptic assertions to lay out the fundamental concepts”, “Marx cryptically asserts”) that simply have to be accepted on their face value... “if you want to understand it”.

You really want do understand it, don't you? Or you want to look dumb among your Marxist friends?

Well, nobody wants to look dumb, except if the only way of understanding is to accept someone's “cryptic assertions” point-blank, is this really “understanding”?

And why is it “daunting”? “The Oxford Handbook” explains:

Marx developed a technical terminology that Marxists have found very useful (e.g., use-​value, exchange-​value, organic composition of capital, etc.) and a method of analysis (dialectical materialism), both of which can be difficult for the uninitiated to understand.

And here we get to the core challenge: you can't read Marx works without an “initiation”. Doesn't it apply to any science, which Marxism claims to be? No, at least not in the same sense: you can study modern economy, physics or computing starting from a very basic knowledge of mathematics. The concepts of “interest” (finance) or “energy” (physics) or “information” (IT) are described using mathematical terms. Most importantly, they are interchangeable, so you can speak of “year's interest on kilowatt-hours spent to process gigabytes of information”.

But that doesn't work in Marxism, for many reasons. For a technical analysis of the, well, “technical terminology” I recommend “The Logic of the Planned Economy: The Seeds of the Collapse” (1991) by Paul H. Dembinsky and “Main Currents of Marxism by Leszek Kołakowski.

My favourite however is the second one: the unique “method of analysis” or dialectical materialism.

Dialectical materialism

I have already written about this method before in my article Marxist dialectics as a instrument of self-delusion, but that was mostly focused on practical, historic examples of its application. “The Oxford Handbook” conveniently provides a tutorial on systematic application of dialectical method, which is composed of a number of steps and statements of “laws of #dialectics”.

Any open mind will approach them with curiosity and try to make any sense of these famous laws... which unavoidably end in a huge cognitive dissonance, because these laws go like this:

“Every thing is undergoing quantitative change of one kind or another, and at one speed or another”

Wait, is that it? Yes, that's about all.

There's a few more “laws of dialectics” and all of them display about as much of sophistication and depth as the one above. There's nothing more, no further secrets of universe hidden in the dialectic method! The best description I've seen so far was coined by a Polish philosopher and disillusioned Marxist Leszek Kołakowski:

The diamat [dialectical materialism] consists of assertions of various kinds. Some of them are banalities of common sense and contain nothing specifically Marxist. Others are philosophical creeds, unprovable and unsolvable by scientific means. Still others are simply nonsense. The fourth category includes assertions that can be interpreted variously and, depending on the interpretation, belong to one, the second or the third of the preceding categories.

You may argue there's nothing wrong with the “undergoing quantitative change” statement — but that's precisely the definition of truism, that Kołakowski is talking about:

Among the claims that are common-sense clichés are such 'laws of dialectics' as saying that everything in the world is somehow connected or that everything changes. These claims are not disputed by anyone, but their cognitive and scientific value is negligible. (...) Phenomena in the world are interconnected, but the problems of scientific analysis of the world lie not in how to take this all-connectedness into account — for this is precisely impossible — but which connections to single out as important and which to omit. On this, in turn, Marxism-Leninism has only to offer the saying that in a chain of phenomena there is always a 'main link' to be grasped. This saying, it seems, means only that in practical behaviour certain links between things are, depending on one's aims, important and others unimportant or less important. It is also a trivial truth of common sense, devoid of cognitive value, since no rules follow from it to establish a hierarchy of importance of relationships for any particular case. The same applies to the saying that “everything changes”; only empirical statements that describe individual changes, their nature, pace, etc., have cognitive value. The saying made philosophical sense in Heraclitus' time, but soon descended into the order of common wisdom known to everyone.

Bertell Ollman, who authored “The Oxford Handbook” chapter on “dialectical method” does seem to capture the core problem of religious approach to the method, yet he clearly presents dialectics as the most powerful analytical tool of all times:

Most methods are meant to apply to only one or at most a few of our problems, but there is at least one method that applies to almost everything, and that is dialectics. It is this vast range and what is required to cover so much territory that gives dialectics its special status but also makes it so difficult to explain, and so easy—​for friends and foes alike—​to distort.

Once you know what really are the “laws”, it's not hard to understand how Soviet biological frauds Trofim Lysenko. Olga Lepeshinskaya and others happily used dialectical method in their works, as it allowed them to deliver an incoherent stream of falsehoods and sylogisms mixed with politically correct references to Marx, Engels, Stalin etc under the guise of “scientific method”. A short sample from Lepeshinskaya's 1950 speech, where she was proving emergence of living cells from inorganic material while bashing “idealistic genetics”:

In our country there are no longer classes hostile to each other, and the struggle of the idealists against the dialectical materialists still, depending on whose interests it defends, has the character of a class struggle. Indeed, the followers of Virchow, Weismann, Mendel and Morgan, who speak of the invariability of the gene and deny the influence of the external environment, are the preachers of the pseudo-scientific stuff of the bourgeois eugenicists and of all perversions in genetics, on the soil of which grew the racial theory of fascism in the capitalist countries. The Second World War was unleashed by the forces of imperialism, which had racism in its armoury.

The whole speech is such a vicious hodge-podge of logical fallacies, mixing biology with capitalism, imperialism, racism, blaming and shaming of political opponents, and countless appeals to authority of the saints: Marx, Engels and ultimately Stalin:

The development of the cell is quite new! Virchow and modern biologists believe that every cell is from a cell. But Engels says something completely different: “The cellless begin their development with a simple protein lump, pulling and retracting in one form or another pseudopodia, — with a monera” (F. Engels. Dialectics of Nature, p. 245. Gosudolitizdat, 1948). (...) Engels defines life as “...the mode of existence of protein bodies, the essential point of which is the constant exchange of substances with the external nature surrounding them, and with the cessation of this exchange of substances life also ceases, which leads to the decomposition of protein” (F. Engels. Dialectics of Nature, p. 244).

If we now return the the Harvey's rather puzzling passages on how you need to accept Marx's “cryptic assertions” — no pressure of course, that's only “if you want to understand” them — that was one of the most common tricks in the world of “dialectical thinking”. If you took Harvey's offer for granted, you haven't actually understood anything for yourself – but your brain has been already rewired! You have accepted the new meaning of the word “understand”, and a dozen of other well-established terms that have a very special meaning in Marxism, you could probably even describe it as a “special sectarian meaning”.

Marx is never wrong

What I find very interesting is the attitude of modern Marxists towards the criticism directed at their start's theories. Marx is never wrong — Marx, at worst, could have been “misread”. It's your fault, not Marx's. In most cases, of course, this happens to those “uninitiated”, but can also happen to those who spend their lives on reading Marx.

“The Oxford Handbook” uses this argument rather frequently, for example quoting one respected researcher who “80 years ago” (as they emphasise) patronised the critics of long dead philosopher that “The Manifest is a cryptic and epigrammatic document and therefore easily misread”. He's talking about one of the fundamental documents, “The Communist Manifesto”, which was targeted at the broadest audience and for the whole century was the defining document for the communist goals and methods.

Yet, according to the modern Marxists, you are apparently not expected to simply read what Marx and Engels have written in their own words, in the context of their 19th century. Furthermore, you are neither expected nor allowed to analyse their writings using logic or confront it against empirical evidence. What you are expected to do is to apply the very special “method of analysis”, available to chosen ones, otherwise you won't be able to “understand” its “correct meaning” as imagined by today's Marxists who desperately want it to remain it “increasingly relevant” even when Marx's postulates are “cryptic” in today's context.

How is that different from 20th century scientology terminology as invented by L. Ron Hubbard, rather universally perceived as pseudo-scientific and sectarian? As Hubbard explains:

It was found that many old words in the field of philosophy, when used, conveyed to people an entirely new idea. The exactness of Dianetics and Scientology required a more precise approach. This approach was achieved by special naming with an eye to minimal confusion with already supposed or known phenomena.

And in the Scientology literature you can actually find excuses identical to those of the modern “explainers of Marxism”:

The only reason a person gives up a study or becomes confused or unable to learn [Scientology] is because he or she has gone past a word that was not understood.

Interestingly, in a rather funny coincidence (?) both”The Oxford Handbook” and Hubbard use the phrase “technical terminology” for their obfuscating use of common terms. Harvey's passage on “accepting critical assertions if you want to understand them” could be just as well written by Hubbard too.

Why is that? There's a very good reason for such obfuscation: while Marxism has been originally declared a proletarian science, it's the opposite of it. In the early days of Bolshevik revolution it was common for an engineer or a mason (both using maths and geometry in their work on daily basis) to stand up on a party meeting and say “excuse me, comrade, but this simply doesn't add up”.

Marxism as an elitist philosophy

Here's exactly where dialectics comes handy, as it allows you to twist meaning of literally everything in order to prove anything, and this is how you end up with a minority party calling themselves “bolshevik” (“the majority ones”), executing fellow Socialist Revolutionary party and anarchists. Ultimately, with dialectics, you end up in the familiar world where “war is peace; freedom is slavery; ignorance is strength”, and I have given more real-life examples in my article Marxist dialectics as a instrument of self-delusion.

With dialectical method, any common conceptual framework or set of fundamental value which could be used to say “wait comrades, we have diverted too much” loses any sense, because now any level of diversion can be dialectically excused. And ultimately the only way of auditing the compliance of the system with its own values is to refer to a higher authority, which will provide one dialectical interpretation today, but it may provide a completely opposite interpretation tomorrow. The only thing you are expected to do is to accept each of them at any given moment without asking questions.

Now, here's the best part: because everyone stands accused of ignorance and lack of sufficient “initiation” required to properly “understand” the special “method”, no criticism is fruitful because any criticism can be evaded. You can't even argue with Marx's written words, because you have, of course, “misread” them!

And Harveys of our times will conveniently explain what Marx truly meant by overlaying his 150 years old “cryptic assertions” on today's context. Have you ever argued with Jehowa's Witnesses?

Once thing is evident in the modern Marxist literature is a rather desperate desire to keep Marxism somewhat afloat — not because it's an useful or precise tool for explaining modern world, but because it's one of the last “grand theories” (literal terms used by “The Oxford Handbook”). And behind the promise of simplicity that comes bundled with these “grand theories” unfortunately comes a requirement for complete immersion in its sectarian language in order to “understand” and, most importantly, switch off any safety brakes most humans have in the form of critical thinking, life experience, mathematics and logic.

But these are required in order to accept Marxism's “simple” solutions: like eradication of a whole class of a society.

— Paweł Krawczyk https://krvtz.net/ Fediverse @kravietz@agora.echelon.pl

In response to a recent #China ambassador in France comment about “unclear legal status” of the former #USSR states[^1] a number of Eastern European countries voiced their protest. For example, Gabrielius Landsbergis, Lithuania MFA:

Lithuania never joined the USSR. Moscow illegally occupied our territory, so we resisted until we restored our independence and the Red Army went back home.[^2]

Why there's even a controversy around such an apparently obvious fact? It's due to how Soviet #Russia annexed these countries. And they did it quite cleverly, preserving a delicate balance of brute force, forgery and theatrical legitimacy, balanced enough to be practical for them but also to be acceptable to be used as a fig leaf for the international community. This allowed them for over half a century maintain a “consensus of ambiguity” in the West: when one historians would talk of occupation, others would refer to the “people's referendums and elections” or “Soviet reconstruction of Poland”, and other classic Soviet-constructed clichés in a “it was not black and white” spirit.

Can't speak for Lithuania as I don't know our friendly neighbour's history well enough, but in case of #Poland this is how it was done:

1. After Germany was defeated by the Allies who then already included USSR, the Soviet troops found themselves all over the territory of Germany-occupied Poland. Red Army was followed by NKVD. Massive looting of Polish territory by Soviet troops continued between 1946 and 1948. Under official orders of Kremlin Soviet troops took away everything they could, from private property to whole factories, farms and even rail tracks.[^3]
2. Soviets created a puppet Polish “Provisional Government of National Unity” and held 100% control of the territory with Red Army and NKVD, continuing purges, arrests, show trials and executions of former anti-German resistance who did not pledge allegiance to the Soviets. For example Witold Pilecki, the man who brought the first solid evidence of the genocide in Auschwitz and fought in Warsaw Uprising... was then accused by Soviets of being “Nazi collaborator” and executed.[^4]
3. In 1946 the puppet government organised a referendum on judicial reforms whose results were entirely falsified.[^5] Why bother? Because in Yalta in 1945 they declared independent and internationally monitored elections will be performed in Poland. The referendum was a delicate trial balloon on the reaction of the West. Apart from admitting the falsifications and “thoughts and prayers” there was none.
4. Consequently, in 1947 Moscow organised full-scale elections which were also entirely falsified.[^6] This way they kind of “legally” passed all authority over Poland to the single Polish and 100% Moscow-controlled communist party, which they only gave away in 1989.
5. Soviet looting of Poland continued all this time, as they weren't yet 100% certain if they will keep control. It reached such an extent that even the puppet Polish authorities protested in secret communications to Moscow that it undermines perception of Russians as “friends and liberators” of Poland. Moscow didn't care because anyone with “undermined perception” could be arrested or executed. Overall, Soviet plunder of Poland was estimated at $54 billion, a fraction of which was then returned in the form of Soviet investments in industries perceived necessary by Moscow, who then boasted massively about how they “helped a brotherly socialist republic”.[^3]

This is exactly how it happened in other Eastern European countries, with adjustments to local specifics.

And if you see some historical similarities to the 2014 “referendums” in 2014 Donbass, Crimea, 2022 in occupied regions of Ukraine, it's because it was the very same playbook they executed in Eastern Europe in 1946-1947: loot, kill, stage some fake referendums and elections, take 100% control and... pretend “they joined voluntarily”.

If Russia succeeded in #Ukraine in 2022, that's what they planned for the whole country. Was that a good plan? Judging by Western lukewarm reaction to 1946-1947, and then 2014, in long-term Russia's plan was good enough. Look, today only 9 years have passed since Russian invasion in 2014 but you can clearly see mainstream voices accepting occupation of Crimea as “not entirely legal but kind of OK”.

Today's absurdity of Russia-staged “referendum on joining Zaporizhzhia oblast' into Russia”[^7] when not a single Russian soldier even managed to enter the very town of Zaporizhzhia (!) is obvious to everyone who watch the conflict closely. Most people likely heard about these “not entirely legal” referendums but do not realize the full extent of the violation of laws and common sense. That's today. Do you think in 50 years anyone would care about that?

Therefore, if you are a bit unsettled by a rather dramatic reaction of Eastern European countries to Russia's or China's statements questioning or undermining their sovereignty today, it's precisely because we have seen first hand where these words lead...

References:

• [^1]: https://www.kyivpost.com/post/16199
• [^2]: https://social.kyiv.dcomm.net.ua/@rubrykaeng/110253606460301710
• [^3]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II_looting_of_Poland#The_Soviet_Union
• [^4]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Witold_Pilecki
• [^5]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1946_Polish_people%27s_referendum
• [^6]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1947_Polish_legislative_election
• [^7]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_annexation_referendums_in_Russian-occupied_Ukraine

— Paweł Krawczyk https://krvtz.net/ Fediverse @kravietz@agora.echelon.pl

When looking for some pre-war analysis of #Russia's foreign policies I found a 2016 article “Russia Today: Three Horsemen of the Russian Apocalypse”^1 by Dr Vladimir Pastukhov, an expert on Eastern Europe and Russia on University of Oxford. Back then the author predicted three scenarios of devolution of Russia, two involving one form of collapse or another, and an third one, moderately optimistic, where Russian elites somehow manage to replace rigid centralism and cult of personality with a true federation and democratic society.

Back in 2016 the author saw the origins of the decline in “thinning of Russia’s 'cultural layer' and consequent degradation of the elites”, but Russian society was notably absent from his analysis. This is understandable, as anyone who has ever been to Russia does realize the endemic and hopeless political passivity of vast majority of its society. I encourage reading the whole article, but I will just leave this final paragraph from the 2016 article here:

The sooner Russia breaks apart, the more painful this process will be. To a large degree, the newly formed states will find themselves under the protectorate of neighboring Japan, China, Iran and Turkey. Central “parent” Russia will remain a part of Europe, but for a long time it will be the continent’s “sick man.” For a long time to come, control over Russia’s remaining nuclear arsenal will continue to be the world community’s major headache. While undergoing this agony, Russia can provoke military conflicts of varying intensity.

Russian society as source of violence

Just recently I stumbled upon another analysis by Dr Pastukhov's, this time posted on his Telegram channel^2 in Russian, and I found it so interesting that I translated it to English. It very much seems like the author, after 24 February, lost all illusions and hopes of Russian society:

In an authoritarian (or, as it is also called, “police”) state, the primary source of unlawful violence is power, which spreads numerous metastases into the fabric of society. In totalitarianism, things are more complicated. Here, power plays only the role of a trigger, the primary link of the disease. It affects the fabric of society in such a way that practically every single cell becomes an autonomous isotope, radiating violence. The role of power is further reduced to a policy of two “P's”: provocation and populism. Power provokes with one hand a permanent demand for violence from society, and with the other it organises a populist response to this ever-increasing demand.

Note the switch of the paradigm: it's no longer “the elites” and their cultural deficit, it's the “fabric of society” and “every single cell” that contributes to the overall country's stance. I do agree with this diagnosis, because I have witnessed this cult of social Darwinism flourishing in Russia for over 20 years – it's always either you or them, win-win situation is a battle lost.

One way or another, the source of lethal radiation in the Putin-designed system is society as a whole, not the government. The power in this system is assigned the role of a dispatcher, which regulates the power and intelligently directs the flow of violence in the right direction. Therefore, if we simply tear down power (“remove Putin”, as many dream of doing), then globally it will only lead in the first stage to controlled chaos becoming unmanageable and organised violence becoming unorganised. We are dealing with a society which radiates violence like enriched uranium radiates radiation. So far it is a controlled reaction, which does not become a chain reaction only because the authorities skilfully dispose of the surplus “dark energy”.

That paragraph caused quite a stir among some of Russians I shared this article with. The paradox of those people is that they feel offended, yet themselves they do not watch the most aggressive Russian state TV shows, where hosts and guests routinely call to kill and torture civilians, eradicate whole towns, eradicate whole Ukraine, whole Europe etc, and they don't watch them... because they find them disgusting and violent!

Yet, they are apparently unable to notice that majority of their compatriots does watch them, and they do cheer their guests. It's the same majority they refer to as “cattle” (быдло), speaking of their rudeness in daily life, aggressive and dangerous driving... and all the other reasons why they fence their modern apartment with thick, steel door from the society outside. Yet, they are unable to step out of the collective Russian identity and admit the authoritarianism wasn't built in Russia overnight.

Future scenarios

Dr Pastukhov isn't particularly optimistic, to put that lightly:

Let's assume that this hand, clutched in its dead grip on the control panel, is cut off. Which scenario seems more likely: society miraculously organizes itself and suppresses the violence within itself, or a chain reaction of violence ensues that will eventually spawn a “new Putin” in a cloud of nuclear mushroom? There is no clear answer, but the second scenario seems more likely to me personally.

Anticipating the reproach that in talking about the inevitable challenges that Russian society will face in the event of a revolution I am giving larger chances to the existing regime, I want to say in my defense that I don't see the need to simplify the situation just because it might scare someone and make them grasp at the existing reality as the last straw. The fearful ones should not think about the future of Russia at all – it's a fairy tale for adults with a bad ending, which people with weak nerves shouldn't read at all. For the rest, I will say that there is already a dilemma that “decent people” prefer to remain silent about. Without a broad democratic movement Russia will not be pulled out of the worn-out rut of decivilization (chronic cultural deficiency) and any democratization under the existing conditions will lead to a flood of the most obscene, pogrom-type violence in the country. The natural and seemingly only possible response to this threat is the decision to lower the braking “lead rods” of the new dictatorship into the overheated, radioactive social mass. That is, having said “A”, it is necessary to agree to “B”. If we accept the inevitability of revolution in Russia, then we must also accept the inevitability of a revolutionary dictatorship in Russia. And if we accept the inevitability of a revolutionary dictatorship, then we must ask ourselves what mechanisms can be proposed to prevent the revolutionary dictatorship from turning into a reactionary one (and Russia from entering the third circle of “Stalinism-Putinism”)?

At this point, I would like to bring back Pastukhov's quote from 2016, which explains the position from which he's assessing the rationality of the Russian society and its elites:

The world community, in spite of its selfish instincts, will have to exercise great wisdom and careful consideration to be able to discern and support the seedlings of a new Russia, for the very simple reason that preserving manageability and stability across such an enormous space are in the vital interest of all humankind. Admittedly, the chances for the realization of this scenario remain very small. (...) For the world at large, preserving Russia’s unity remains without any doubt the least expensive and the least dangerous scenario.

Returning to the 2023 publication, Pastukhov is pessimistic specifically because you can't impose a mature democracy on a society that does not want it:

The guarantees of the rule of law and constitutionalism (and, of course, democracy) do not lie in the legal and institutional plane, but in the cultural and political planes. The only real guarantee against an eternal dictatorship is a constitutional-democratic social consensus, that is, a value-based (if you like, “conceptual”) unity among the elite. Everything else is a mirage.

Is this possible at all? I believe it's certainly not impossible: Russian elites tried one way (Dugin's anti-rationalism) and they may learn their lesson or may not. There's nothing preventing more optimistic scenarios for Russia... other than widespread belief that you can bully your neighbour, either on a shared stairway or on a shared continent, by mere brute force. Whether the lesson will be learned certainly depends on the outcome of the military stage of the war, because if Putin is given an opportunity to even pretend a victory, what's any lesson to learn here?

— Paweł Krawczyk https://krvtz.net/ Fediverse @kravietz@agora.echelon.pl

For a few decades now there was an interesting model of #Russia statehood discussed inside the country, called the “theory of opers and operators”, created by Aleksandr Volkov.^2 Its name is a game of words: “operators” was allegedly term used by FBI to describe financial managers of KGB assets in the West. “Oper”, as in “operative”, is a Russian slang word for KGB officers.

Quoting directly from one of recent articles that describe the theory:^1

The gist of the theory is that in the early 1970s the KGB of the USSR set up a network of offshore companies to help foreign trade missions circumvent Western sanctions on the purchase of high-tech equipment. The oil crisis and the increase in the US discount rate to 20% under Ronald Reagan led to the accumulation of considerable sums in the accounts of #KGB offshore companies, which ended up in a grey area: the party organs no longer controlled them, while from the Western perspective they were normal capitals. Having both large sums and understanding of how they could be disposed of, officers in Soviet foreign offices began to invest money and make profits within the framework of Western economy. As a result, in the 1980s, the KGB's offshore capital rose to its feet and became independent of cash infusions from the [Soviet] Union.

While Soviet Union existed, the cash was kind of frozen – KGB officers couldn't spend it completely at their will, only steal fraction on various service-related expenses. But then comes 1991 and everything changed:

After the fall of the #USSR, these funds are partly returned home and used to buy up assets. In the framework of the theory, the nineties are a period of struggle between the KGBists, who have settled in the West, and the party-economic elite of the former USSR – a struggle for control of the assets of the communist empire. The Chekists, as a more consolidated group, having at their disposal large capitals, financial infrastructure and, most importantly, close ties with the security/law enforcement agencies on the ground – won this struggle by gobbling up both the “red directors” and the “new Russians” from the organised crime. By the late nineties and early 2000's, the process of redistribution of big business was complete. The offshore Chekists had taken control of the biggest assets and could have stopped their careers at this.

But history never stops at any given moment — the “old guard” could have earned billions by merely working in KGB/FSB, then why not us, thought young aspiring officers? The financial success of the KGB created a huge demand for jobs in the security services, but there were no longer any secret KGB stashes abroad. Another solution was found:

By that time, a mechanism had been developed for taking over businesses through quasi-legal mechanisms and, most importantly, a large layer of operatives had grown up who perceived racket as an organic part of their career development. Since the youngsters could not repeat the success their ancestors, they turned for the regular people: they started stealing first medium and then small businesses. In fact, the devouring of businesses by low-ranking Chekists (hungry operatives) is the main content of 2000-2010's. It is typical that during this period Putin systematically called for an end to the crackdown on business, but in fact did nothing about it, because he simply could not go against the backbone of the regime.

Widespread racket, takeover and stealing of businesses in Russia in 2000-2010's is a fact: all private media and TV stations were taken over this way — cases of Vladimir Gusinsky^3, VK^4, Hermitage Capital Management^5 were most reported, but there were thousands of other smaller and less known companies stolen.

The authors of the “theory of opers and operators” believe that this wave of cannibalistic takeovers, often carried out by people with zero experience in business, led to gradual decline of Russian economy and decline of its competitiveness.

There was nothing more valuable left to be taken over, but appetites of the “opers” were still high, and their cadres were still growing in numbers – I remember statistics where at some point ~15% of the working population in some regions was employed in some kind of security services.

Grab for Ukraine

The authors believe the conflict with #Ukraine that started in 2014^6 is largely influence by the economic motives among the Russian security apparatus running out of businesses to steal in their own country, as described above. Having said that, authors interestingly point out that while annexation of #Crimea logically seems to be an extension of this “economic grab”, they argue motivation behind specifically Crimea was entirely political.

If we stick to economic determinism, we can assume that the return of Crimea was dictated by a desire to expand the fodder base of the KGBists. In fact, this (inherently Marxist) assumption is flawed. If Putin had been guided by this consideration, he would have taken not a single (and very small) region, but all or a significant part of Ukraine, redistributing property there and distributing fodder. This, as we know, did not happen.

I cannot but notice, that the article contradicts itself in this specific part: the authors argue that “the new aristocracy” (FSB) had no motives to start the whole “Crimean affair”, thus hurting their own interests, only to satisfy the appetites of their younger colleagues. Firstly, the economic decline in 2010's Russia was a fact, as was declining ratings of Putin (record low 62% in 2013), and constantly growing security apparatus.

In 2013 there was a strong pressure on Ukraine for “economic integration” with Russia and the very direct cause for #Euromaidan was specifically the surprising decision of Yanukovych to turn away EU association agreement^7 and instead join Russian economic zone. If the latter happened, FSB could simply continue expanding their “fodder base” into Ukraine unhindered, as it did in Russia. But that was prevented by mass-scale protests of Ukrainians, by order of magnitude larger than Russian protests against Putin's “re-election” in 2012.^8

And as the fodder has been taken away from FSB, they had a strong motivation to at least grab Crimea, which would both provide some consolation to the hungry elites, punishment for Ukraine, and rating boost for Putin.

Crimea certainly provided a wealthy trophy, as wave of business takeovers demonstrated shortly after it was annexed, with plenty of new private, fenced beaches in the most attractive places.^9 How does war in #Donbass fit into this hypothesis? It's interesting case, because politically war in Donbass has been a complete failure, leading to no political wins and instead a lengthy, frozen conflict and plenty of troubles for Russia.

Was there anyone gaining from war in Donbass? Of course — only in the first two years of the war over 50% of large industrial enterprises have been looted by occupiers^10 and, noted by many people, the absurd separation into two — Luhansk and Donetsk — “People's Republics”, has no political purpose or explanation. But it creates perfect “zones of exclusive economic rights” between organized crime controlled by FSB and GRU respectively. And, as with every organized crime groups competing for resources, there were a number of assassinations of top LPR/DPR heads and even shootings between LPR and DPR militias.

FSB and the war in Ukraine

Returning to the Ukrainian extension of the “theory of opers and operators”, authors believe this orientation of Russian elites exclusively on its own wealth and welfare explains lukewarm attitudes towards the victory. Make no mistake, the authors represent 100% Russian nationalist view and definitely support the idea of forcible submission of Ukraine, they are just critical of how Putin does it.

They believe what others call “incompetence” is simply result of different than official actual goals of the conflict: they argue, the “economic vector” explains the vague and frequently changing official objectives of the “special military operation”, lack of any specific description of what “victory” would mean for Russia in this war, but also demoralisation inside Russia itself — widespread corruption in the army, theft of military equipment that would otherwise help war effort and even shutting down of specific military industries when they are most needed.

In essence, the Chekist regime seeks not so much to win as to adapt to conditions new to it (in fact, the conditions of a forced and unnatural confrontation between bees and honey). Within this logic, the population and the economy continue to be viewed solely as fodder (and hence there is nothing strange about the sawing up of a factory needed for the front), and the military defeat and destruction of Ukraine does not look particularly attractive.

The advantage of an extended war, for Russian “elites” following this logic, is not only the mobilization effort which allows continued theft on the generously allocated military budget (30% of overall state budget now!), mobilization of the poorest parts of the society (who had been likely kept in this state for the last decade for purpose) with the perspective of generous military compensations^11 but also unrestricted looting of the newly occupied territories.

Looting on mass scale allows to at least for a while satisfy not only individual “entrepreneurs” on all levels, from regular soldiers stealing electronics or jewellery from Ukrainian homes, large scale theft of Ukrainian grain and up to professionally organised theft of artwork from Kherson museum^12, but — most importantly — the FSB that likely takes share of every item brought back to Russia.

— Paweł Krawczyk https://krvtz.net/ Fediverse @kravietz@agora.echelon.pl

Oleg Pshenichnyi from The Insider made a great collection of quotes from leaders of #Russia, #Ukraine and international politicians related to the war. Unfortunately, so far it has been only published in Russian. Here's the collection in automated DeepL translation (with a few manual tweaks). I have posted a similar analysis back in June (Russian deception and denial of war in Ukraine), and it indeed shares some of the quotes with this one, but of course Pshenichnyi list is much larger as it spans over the whole year. I find these quotes to be very valuable evidence of rapidly changing Russian narratives and justifications.

January: “Russia is not going to attack anyone!

UK Foreign Office: “We have information indicating that the Russian government is seeking to install a pro-Russian leader in Kiev as it as it considering the invasion and occupation of Ukraine”.

White House press secretary Jen Psaki: “President Putin created this crisis, by gathering 100,000 Russian soldiers along the Ukrainian border. We have reached a level of level of tension that Russia is ready to launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine at any moment.”

Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen Mark Milley: “Given the kind of forces assembled – ground manoeuvre forces, artillery, ballistic missiles, air force – if all this is used together against Ukraine, something very serious will happen that will lead to a significant number of casualties. Can you imagine what it would look like in densely populated areas, near roads and so on. It could be just nightmarish.”

Sergey Lavrov (to US Secretary of State): “You claim that we are going to attack Ukraine, even though we have already explained many times that this is not the case.”

Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov: “There is no risk of a large-scale war that could break out in Europe or elsewhere. We do not intend to take any aggressive actions. We do not intend to attack or invade Ukraine.”

The Russian Embassy in the US: “Once again we emphasise: Russia is not going to attack anyone. The practice of moving troops on our own soil is our sovereign right. We urge that there be no more hysteria and no more tension around the problem of Donbas. And most importantly, do not encourage “hotheads” in Kyiv to new provocations”.

Vladimir Zelenski: “What is the news, exactly? Hasn't this been a reality for 8 years? Didn't the invasion begin in 2014? Isn't the threat of a large-scale war appeared only now? This danger has been around for more than a day. And they haven't become bigger. The hype around them has gotten bigger. And now they're actively attacking not our but on your nerves. So that you have a constant sense of unease. All of our citizens, especially the elderly, need to understand that. Breathe out and calm down. Don't run out for buckwheat and matches. What should you do? There's only one thing to do. calmness, a cool head, confidence in your forces, in your army, in our Ukraine. <...> And I am sure that in my New Year address I will say: “Dear Ukrainians! Didn't I tell you? We are good!” We did not panic. We were not provoked. We were calm and strong and we are greeting the next New Year. Without panic. Without no horror. Hopefully without viruses. And I sincerely believe – without war.

Boris Johnson: “We have agreed that we will respond in a coordinated manner to any Russia's attack on Ukraine. In a co-ordinated way, by imposing tough joint sanctions, which will be tougher than any we have ever imposed on Russia before.”

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg: “Ukraine poses no threat to Russia. It is the idea of a democratic, stable Ukraine that is a problem for [Kremlin]... The risk of conflict is great. Russia's aggressive actions undermine security in Europe...NATO will engage in substantive dialogue with Russia in a spirit of benevolence. However, one must be prepared for the possibility that diplomacy will fail... Aggression against Ukraine will have will have serious consequences for Russia”.

February. “Russian warship”.

Vladimir Putin: “Our plans do not include the occupation of Ukrainian territories. We We are not going to impose anything on anyone by force. We will strive demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine.

Volodymyr Zelenski: “The battle is happening here. I need arms, not evacuation”.

Alexei Navalny: “This war is designed to distract attention from Russia's problems... I think those who started this war are bandits and thieves”.

Boris Johnson: “This is an attack on democracy and freedom in Eastern Europe and around the world. world. We will make sure that this terrible, barbaric adventure by Vladimir Putin will fail.”

Genichesk resident: “You are occupiers! You are fascists! You fascists! Why the fuck did you come with guns to us? Put some sunflowers in your pockets, when you're down here...!”

Ukrainian border guard: “Russian warship – fuck you!

The mate of a Georgian refuelling ship (to a Russian ship): “If you run out of fuel you run out of fuel – you can use your oars”.

Dan Watson of the Red Cross: “For ordinary people, the situation is apocalyptic.”

Miloš Zeman: “I said the Russians are not crazy and will not attack Ukraine. I admit that I was wrong... A madman must be isolated”.

Oleksiy Arestovych, advisor to the Ukrainian president's office: “According to our data, the first Russian Federation's strike has failed.”

March. “This is where we bury them.”

Vladimir Putin: “Saving people from a genocide is the main goal of the special operation in Ukraine.”

Vladimir Zelensky: “The strike on Kharkiv is a war crime, state terrorism of the Russian Federation. After this, Russia is a terrorist state.”

Pavel Kirilenko, head of the Donetsk region: “The town of Volnovakha no longer no longer exists”.

Mariupol deputy mayor Serhiy Orlov: “In the bombed out Drama Theatre building there were sheltering 1,000 to 2,000 residents [...] 80-90% of the city was bombed. Not a building is without damage. Either destroyed or damaged”.

Ramzan Kadyrov: “We should go into Kiev and take Kiev away. If we had been left near Kiev, we would have gone into Kiev and cleaned up”.

Alexander Lukashenko: “And now I will show you from where Belarus was being prepared to was being prepared to attack. And if six hours before the operation there had not been a preemptive – I'll show you a map – they would have attacked our troops.”

Alexei Arestovich: “The Russian army is not strong. It is just long. Eight out of Putin's ten armies are here. This is where we bury them...”

Lyudmila Narusova: “ were forced to sign a contract or were signed for them The conscripts were made to sign the contract or they signed it for them. But in the end only four of the company of a hundred men survived”.

Channel One editor Marina Ovsyannikova: “Russia is an aggressor country. And the responsibility for this crime lies only on the conscience of one person. And that person is Vladimir Putin... Unfortunately, for the last few years I have been working Channel One, doing Kremlin propaganda, and I am now very ashamed for that”.

Joe Biden: “Two hundred thousand Russians have already fled from Putin [...] God knows this man man cannot stay in power.”

April. “How do you negotiate with a crocodile?

Volodymyr Zelenskyy: “We will establish the full truth about all these atrocities . No matter how much time and effort it takes, we will find them all.”

Sergey Lavrov: “As a gesture of goodwill, changed the configuration of troops in Chernihiv and Kiev oblasts, but this was not appreciated. Immediately there was a staging in Bucha. This plot was played out in the same way as the plot with Skripals, with the Malaysian Boeing, Navalny, Litvinenko”.

Alexei Arestovich: “Those who attack don't usually take trophies. You don't go to Kiev with a carpet under your arm... When they realised they were going to retreat and there's nothing to lose, they started to execute it all...”

Boris Johnson: “How can you negotiate with a crocodile when it has your leg in in its jaws?”

Frank-Walter Steinmeier, German president: “My commitment to the “Nord Stream 2 was clearly a mistake. We were holding on to bridges that Russia no longer believed in, as our partners warned us.”

Sergei Shoigu: “The US and Western-controlled countries... are demonstrating intentions to provoke the Kiev regime to fight to the last Ukrainian.”

Maxim Marchenko, head of the Odessa military administration: “The missile cruiser Moskva went exactly where our border guards sent it today on Snake Island.”

The sunken cruiser Moskva

Antonio Guterres, UN Secretary-General: “I was shocked when I was told that two rockets exploded in the city of Kiev, where I am. This is a dramatic war and we absolutely need to end this war, to have a way out of of this war.”

FSB CJC: “A group of members of the Russian-banned neo-Nazi terrorist organization National Socialism/White Power – Russian citizens – have been detained. By orders from SBU they planned assassination of a well-known journalist Vladimir Solovyov. During a search of the detainees, we found and seized an improvised explosive device. an improvised explosive device, a rifle cut from a hunting rifle, pistols and cartridges, Molotov cocktail type incendiary devices, a grenade as well as forged Ukrainian passports”.

May. “Russia is here forever”.

Andrei Turchak: “I wanted to say once again to the residents of the Kherson region that Russia is here forever. There should be no doubt about that”.

Alexei Navalny: “You will suffer a historic defeat in this stupid war, that you have started. It has no purpose and no meaning”.

Lithuanian Seimas (unanimous): “The Kremlin regime seeks to destroy the Ukrainian. Therefore, such actions must be recognized as genocide, and Russia is a State which supports terrorism. A state that supports and carries out terrorism”.

Valeriy Zaluzhniy, AFU Commander-in-Chief: “Informed my American counterpart I have informed my American colleague about the transition of Ukrainian defence forces to counteroffensive actions in the Kharkiv and Izyum directions”.

Andriy Melnyk, Ukraine's ambassador to Germany: “Militarily, Berlin has simply abandoned Ukraine. They probably lack leadership and courage”.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz: “Already now Vladimir Putin has failed in all his strategic goals. A Russian takeover of the whole of Ukraine is even less realistic today than than at the beginning of the war. Putin cannot be allowed to win his war. And I am convinced that he will not “he will not win it.

Vladimir Zelensky: “Mr. Kissinger, for example, emerges from the deep past and says that it is allegedly necessary to give Russia a piece of Ukraine. Such It feels like Mr. Kissinger has 1938 on the calendar, not 2022, and he thinks he's talking to an audience not in Davos but in what was then Munich.”

Sergey Lavrov: “Zelensky is making an argument: what kind of Nazification if he is a Jew. I could be wrong, but Hitler also had Jewish blood. Wise Jewish people say that the most ardent anti-Semites tend to be are usually Jews. “There's always a Jew in the family”, as we say.

Alexander Lukashenko: “I absolutely believe that the use of nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine is inadmissible, also because it is close to us. Not exactly here, but not across the ocean, like the United States.”

Yuri Shevchuk, musician: “The homeland, my friends, is not the president's asshole that you have to all the time, you have to kiss it. The homeland is a pauper granny at a train station selling selling potatoes. This is the motherland.”

June. “A gesture of goodwill”

Mikhail Piotrovsky, Director of the Hermitage: “On the one hand, war is blood On the other hand it is the self-affirmation of the people, the self-affirmation of the nation. Every man wants to assert himself. And in his position on the war, is undoubtedly self-asserting itself. And we've all been brought up in the imperial and an empire unites many nations.

Max Pokrovsky, musician: “If the colour of the nation is so rotten that it cannot get together and sing one anti-war song (and, as we know, many do the exact opposite), what can we expect from the nation?”

Vadim Boychenko, mayor of Mariupol: “Our cautious figure, while we could still It is 22 thousand civilians killed by the occupation troops. This is many times more than Nazi Germany did in two years of occupation.”

Vladimir Putin (on the missile attack on a shopping mall in Kremenchug with dozens of casualties): “Yes, there was no terrorist act, no explosion. No one just shoots and strikes just like that in the fields, as a rule it is done against targets we've been exploring. I am sure that the same thing happened in this case. The Russian army doesn't strike any civilian objects.”

Igor Konashenkov, Russian Ministry of Defence spokesman: “In a move of goodwill, the Russian Armed Forces have completed their tasks on Snake Island and withdrawn the garrison there.”

Emmanuel Macron: “We must not humiliate Russia so that when the fighting so that when the fighting stops, we can find a way out through diplomatic solutions.”

Dmytro Kuleba, Ukrainian Foreign Minister: “Calls not to allow the humiliation of Russia can only humiliate France or any other country that would to call for it. Because Russia humiliates itself. We are all better off concentrate on putting the Russian Federation in its place. This will bring peace back and save lives.”

Colin Kahl, US deputy defence secretary: “The HIMARS will give the Ukrainians more capabilities to confront them. Right now, they have the howitzers that we've already given them, and the range of the HIMARS is more than twice as long, which will allow them – even with fewer launchers – to be more successful against [Russian forces].”

Grigory Yavlinsky: “Smart Voting” at the behest of the “leader” [Alexei Navalny], which was announced as a protest vote and became mass among people who called themselves liberals, in reality it turned out to be a vote for representatives of pro-government parties that supported, support and will continue to support the war.”

Leo Tolstoy (quote for which Moscow MP Pavel Yarilin): “And stupefied by prayers, sermons, proclamations, processions, pictures, newspapers, cannon fodder, hundreds of thousands of people uniformly dressed, with a variety of murder weapons, leaving their parents, their wives, their children with a longing in their their hearts, but with a youthfulness in their hearts, go to the place where, at the risk of death, to do the most terrible thing of all: killing people they don't know and who have done them no harm.”

July. “We will pick up and take away. Ukrainian children will be ours”.

Vladimir Putin: “It was not Russia who unleashed the war in Ukraine, but the collective West... Everyone should know that we, by and large, have not started anything serious yet.”

Putin: “Everyone should know that we haven't even really started yet”.

Unnamed US DOD official – CNN: “Russia has sent about 85% of its army to invade Ukraine. Russian casualties amount to thousands of lieutenants and captains, hundreds of colonels and many generals.”

Alexei Arestovich: “I have one answer: 'You haven't started, but you're already finished'. Everyone can see these endeavours have very little time left. A month and a half and they will stall quietly. They won't be able to advance any more”.

Anton Krasovsky, propagandist: “There was a discussion whether a tear of our Russian child is worth the tear of a Ukrainian child... When we take back these lands and the children will be Russian, then we will protect them.... We will take back, take back, take back – and these children will be ours.”

Anna Kuznetsova, Deputy Chairman of the State Duma of the Russian Federation: “The evacuation of more than 2,000 orphaned children has been carried out since the start of the special military operation (SSO) from the territory of Ukraine to Russia”.

Vladimir Zelensky (on the strike on Nikolaev): “It is a double crime to It is a double crime to destroy pedagogical institutes, so that there is no educational institution, and new teachers can't be taught. But don't let the terrorists hope that this that it will do them any good. We will definitely rebuild everything they have destroyed, every one of more than 2,000 educational institutions, all kindergartens, all schools, institutes, universities, and most importantly, we will preserve our humanity and civility.”

Ukrainian army general staff: “Explosions in Olenivka, which led to the deaths of Ukrainian prisoners of war are a deliberate provocation and an undeniable act of terrorism by the occupier's armed forces. According to the Ukrainian Defence Ministry's GUR. Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, it was committed by mercenaries from the Wagner PMC. The organization and execution of the terrorist act was not coordinated with the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Defence. The main purpose of the terrorist act is to conceal the facts of total embezzlement of funds allocated for the Ukrainian prisoners of war. It is known that a commission from Moscow was due to arrive at the “facility” on 1 August.”

Ramzan Kadyrov: “We are already developing a plan for the demilitarisation of NATO countries, and the first The first one after the capture of Kiev is Poland <...> Poland will become a reality as fast as it has become a country if it doesn't stop yapping, as quickly as it became a country if it doesn't stop yapping”.

Dmitry Chistyakov, a retired EMERCOM official: “No more bloodshed! Don't be fooled by the phrase, that “we'll never know the whole truth anyway! Everything is not so clear-cut!”. In a world where every move is filmed on an iPhone and every shop has a security camera in every store, oblivion won't work. In my second Chechen war, I pretty soon I understood what it was like and that's why I'm not a member of any veteran organization. War is a monstrosity which is not worthy of glorification, it is always a savoury set of of war crimes.”

Dmytro Kuleba, Ukrainian foreign minister: “Let's first change the situation on the front, and then we will talk to Russia. Everyone understands that the negotiations are directly “Everyone understands that the negotiations are directly linked to the situation at the front. I simply say to all our partners: “Russia should sit down at the negotiating table Russia should come to the negotiating table after its defeat on the battlefield. Otherwise it will be the language of ultimatums again...”

August: “Tired of your Russophobic clucking”

Dmitry Medvedev: “European bosses are fed up with their Russophobic clucking about Schengen visas for citizens of our country. They'd better introduce a total ban on those visas.”

Vladimir Zelenski: “The most important sanctions are closing the borders. Let them live in their own world until they change their philosophy (...) Whatever kind of Russians they are... send them back to Russia. Then they will understand. They will say, “This [war] has nothing to do with us. The whole population can't be held responsibility, can it?” It can. The population has chosen this government, and they doesn't fight it, doesn't argue with it, doesn't shout at it.”

Russian Deputy Defence Minister Aleksandr Fomin: “The Kiev authorities do not limit themselves by any moral or legal standards. On a daily basis, members of nationalist battalions commit crimes that are not properly assessed by the international community. The shelling of markets, railway stations, residential neighbourhoods, humanitarian aid distribution points and other places of of mass gatherings of people.”

Catherine Russell, UNICEF director: “At least 972 children have been killed or injured as a result of violence since the escalation of the war in Ukraine. And these are just figures that the United Nations has been able to verify.”

The Ukrainian representation to the EU: “We are grateful to the European Union for joining Ukraine's case before the International Court of Justice against Russia on charges of genocide.

Oleksiy Reznikov: “A new threat to Ukraine could be the fatigue of the of the international community from this war. “I call it fatigue syndrome, and for me this is one of the main threats, and we need to work with this threat... Because it is very, very dangerous for us”.

Donald Trump: “Putin couldn't attack Ukraine if it were me. Ukrainians could have given up Crimea. They could have said 'OK, we won't join NATO,” and would have had a country, because I think Putin wanted to to make an agreement.”

Olga Stefanyshyna, Ukraine's deputy prime minister: “Once upon a time, we aspired to join NATO to become part of a collective security system and prevent a big war. Today the situation is different. On the territory of Ukraine there is an ongoing full-scale war, during which NATO as an organisation has nothing to We work more individually with allied states and they themselves are more inclined to bilateralism. They are more inclined to bilateral cooperation.”

Mikhail Podolyak: “The massive shelling of Ukraine on Independence Day is yet another manifestation of the helplessness and terrorist nature of the Russian barbarians after six months of disgrace and defeat. Is it still not clear that the attempt to intimidate Ukrainians is a totally losing idea? Better think about the final “goodwill gesture”.

Vladimir Zelenskiy: “What is the end of war for us? We used to say: peace. Now we say: victory... And we don't sit down at the negotiating table out of fear, with with a gun to our head. And we put our hands up only once – when we celebrate to celebrate our victory. All over Ukraine. Because we do not bargain with our our lands and our people. For us Ukraine is the whole Ukraine. All 25 regions, without any concessions or compromises.”

September. “We gained air and at my command – Hurrah! Hurrah! Hurrah!”

Russian Defence Ministry (on the retreat from Kharkiv Region): ““It has been decided to regroup Russian troops in the Balakley and Izyum districts. To this end, within three days. An operation was carried out to roll back and organize the redeployment Izyum-Balakleya group of troops to the territory of the DPR”.

St Petersburg municipal deputies: “We believe that President Putin's decision Putin's decision to launch the USO is detrimental to the security of Russia and its citizens. In this connection we ask you to propose to bring charges of treason against the President of the Russian Federation to remove him from office”.

Alla Pugacheva: “Please count me among the ranks of foreign agents of my beloved country, for I stand in solidarity with my husband, an honest, decent and sincere man, “a true and incorruptible patriot of Russia, who wishes his homeland prosperity, peaceful life, freedom of speech, and an end to the deaths of our boys for illusory causes, making our country a pariah and weighing down the lives of our citizens.”

Alexei Navalny: “My demand: an end to the criminal war and idiotic mobilisation.”

Alexei Gorinov, political prisoner (final word in court): “I want to admit my guilt. Guilt before the long-suffering people of Ukraine... The guilt that I, as a citizen of my country, I was not able to do anything, I was not able to prevent the ongoing madness.”

Ruslan Zinin, who shot the military commander of Ust-Ilimsk: “Now we will all go home and no one will fight”.

Viktor Orban, Hungarian prime minister: “The war in Ukraine may continue until 2030 г. Ukraine could lose 1/3 or 50% of its territory. The war would have been Ukraine's war but the West has intervened and made it global. By imposing restrictions, Europe is shooting itself in the foot.”

Vladimir Putin: “Politicians in Europe have to convince their fellow citizens to eat less, bathe less and dress warmly at home. And those who start asking “and ask fair questions like 'why is it like this?'” – are immediately labeled enemies, extremists and radicals.”

Vladimir Zelenski: “Our state has always offered Russia to agree to coexistence on equal, fair, dignified and just terms. Obviously, this is impossible with this Russian president. He does not know what dignity and honesty. That is why we are ready for a dialogue with Russia, but with another president of Russia.

Vladimir Putin: “We took in the air and on my command on the count of three. One, two, three! (cheering) Hooray! (cheering) Hooray! Hooray!”

October. “Use your brains!”

Anton Krasovsky: “Such should have been drowned in Tysin. You said that “Moskals occupied them” – and you just throw them into the river with a strong current. There every hut is called Smerekova Hata. Right into this Smerek's hut... to hammer and burn”.

Vladimir Putin: “I will talk to the lawyers. Even, frankly, I haven't I have not even thought about whether it is necessary to declare by decree that the partial mobilisation is complete. But it is completed, the point has been set.”

Dmitry Peskov: (on the borders of the annexed regions). “Part of the clarification has already has arrived, I'll tell you in less legal terms. The LNR and DNR are the borders of 2014. Kherson and Zaporizhzhya – we will continue to consult with the population of these regions.”

G7 statement: ““The G7 strongly condemns and unequivocally rejects Russia's unlawful attempt to annex the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporozhye and Kherson regions of Ukraine and Kherson oblasts of Ukraine, in addition to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of city of Sevastopol. We solemnly reaffirm that we will never recognize this illegal annexation or the bogus referendums Russia uses to justify it.”

UN General Assembly: “Russia's unlawful actions regarding illegal Referendums held on 23-27 September 2022 in the Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk and Kherson regions of Ukraine, Luhansk and Kherson regions of Ukraine, and the subsequent attempt to illegally annexation of these oblasts is null and void and does not constitute grounds for any change in the status of these oblasts of Ukraine”.

Kirill Stremousov, deputy head of the occupation administration in Kherson: “There is no movement. They will not enter Kherson, it is impossible”.

Vladimir Putin: ““Any alternative point of view is declared in the West as subversive propaganda and a threat to democracy, the Kremlin is seen everywhere. Whatever comes out of Russia is now all the machinations of the Kremlin. Are we really so all-powerful? This is nonsense, what a descent to. You can not blame everything on the intrigues of the Kremlin. Use your brains!”

RUSSIAN FEDERAL SECURITY SERVICE: “The organizer of the terrorist attack on the Crimean bridge was the Main Directorate of Ukrainian Defence Intelligence Directorate, its head Kirill Budanov, his staff and agents. Citizens of Ukraine were involved in organising the transport of cargo from Bulgaria to the port of Poti, Georgia, and then to Armenia. In order to transport the cargo from Bulgaria to the port of Poti, Georgia, and then on to Armenia, Ukrainian nationals Mikhail Tsyurkalo, born in 1975 in Kovalyk, were involved, born in 1975, Denis Olegovich Kovach, born in 1979, Roman Ivanovich Solomko, born in 1971. Mr. Solomko Roman Ivanovich, born in 1971; Mr. Inosaridze Sandro, a citizen of Georgia, a broker named “Levan”; and Mr. Terchanian Artur, a citizen of Armenia. Artur Terchanyan, born in 1985.”

Vladimir Zelenski: “We certainly didn't order that.”

Ukrainian GUR (on the first mass rocket attack on Ukrainian cities): “Russian occupation forces have been instructed by the Kremlin to prepare massive missile strikes on Ukraine's civilian infrastructure as early as 2 and 3 October. Strategic and long-range aviation units received orders to to prepare for the task of massive rocket attacks. The targets were determined to be critical civilian infrastructure and central areas of densely populated Ukrainian cities.”

November. “If we manage to lose, The Hague awaits even the Kremlin janitor”

Sergei Surovikin (on the surrender of Kherson): “Comrade Minister of Defence, I report. “We are successfully resisting all enemy offensive attempts. <...>...<...> Comprehensively having assessed the situation, it is proposed to take up defence along the left bank of the of the Dnieper River. I understand that this is a very difficult decision”.

Oleksiy Arestovich: “Let's get this right – the Russian army is not leaving Kherson. It has been knocked out of Kherson by the Ukrainian Defence Forces”.

Ekaterina Shulman: “I have one question: why did you rewrite the constitution, you lazybones? With the kind of military fortune we have, we could have wisely waited. This is the basic law, not the Notes by the Bedside, it's not all the events of the day.”

Margarita Simonyan: “If we manage to lose, The Hague awaits even the janitor who sweeps the paving stones inside the Kremlin wall. What good will it do us if one more district of Kiev goes without light or or not? The scale of the catastrophe our country will turn into if we manage to do it [lose] can't even be imagined.”

Vladimir Putin (to Nina Pshenichkina, whose son died in Luhansk in 2019): “We will all leave this world someday...Some do or don't live, it is not clear. And how do they leave? From vodka or something else. But your son lived. And his his goal was accomplished. That means he did not leave life in vain.”

Yevgeny Prigozhin (on the defector Nuzhin killed with a sledgehammer): “As for the perpetrator, the show shows that he didn't find happiness in Ukraine, but he met unkind but fair people. It seems to me that this film is called “To a Dog, Death by a Dog.” It's a great director's work, and it's... in the same breath. I hope no animals were harmed during the filming”.

Andrey Loshak, documentary filmmaker: “Russian missiles plunge Ukraine into darkness. Russia itself has been living in darkness for a long time, now dragging stubbornly into it Ukrainians who are desperately resisting. With the imposition of sanctions on energy sanctions, darkness has become a staple of Russian exports. ... There is not a single idea how to make the world a better place. ... No matter how many bombs the Russian army drops on Ukraine's power grid, the country will have a bright future and Russians will have an endless bad trip, a long and painful plunge into the heart of darkness.”

Dmitry Medvedev: “Against us today is part of a dying world. It is a bunch of insane Nazi junkies, a nation drugged and intimidated by them, and a large pack of barking dogs from the Western kennel. With them a motley pack of grunting gilts and and the small-minded philistines of a collapsed western empire with drool dripping down their chins of degenerate saliva. They have no faith and no ideals except their own made-up and their own obscene habits and standards of doublethink that deny the morality bestowed upon normal men. So by rising up against them. have gained sacred power.”

Volodymyr Zelenskiy: “If someone proposes a way for us to return Crimea back into the country in a non-military way, I would only be in favour. If, however, a possible solution is military, then there is no need to waste time on this.”

Alexei Navalny: “General Sergei Surovikin is not only a war criminal, but also a common thief. “General Armageddon... has already made hundreds of millions of rubles from the war in Syria and bought himself luxury housing with that money. Now all of his family's his family's assets are simply classified. Maria Singer and Georgy Alburov, in a new investigation reveals how one of Russia's top military Russia's top military leader.”

December. “Gerasimov is a faggot and a fuckin' devil.”

Vladimir Putin “We have nothing to reproach ourselves with. We have always considered the Ukrainian people as a brotherly people. I still think so. What is happening is, of course, our common tragedy. But it is not the result of our politics.”

Alexander Kibovsky, head of the Moscow department of culture: “We are fighting Nazis. That's why it's right to quote Konstantin Simonov's lines: 'So kill one! Then kill him quickly! As many times as you see!” Work, brothers!”

Valery Fadeyev, head of the HRC of Russian Federation: “The Nobel Peace Prize has ceased to be a prize of any significance, and secondly, it is no longer a peace prize, It has finally discredited itself with today's decision. I would like to advise the Russian Memorial to give up this prize in order to retain to preserve at least a vestige of good memories of itself.”

Vladimir Putin: “Maximum focus and concentration of forces is now required from the counter-intelligence agencies, including the military. It is necessary to harshly suppress the actions of foreign secret services. The actions of foreign intelligence services must be harshly suppressed and traitors, spies and saboteurs must be promptly identified.”

Wagner PMC mercenaries: “To the Chief of General Staff: you're a f*cking faggot and a fucker. We have nothing to fight with, we have no shells. We're here at Bakhmut against the entire the entire Ukrainian army. There's nothing else to fucking call you but one word.”

Vladimir Putin: “99.9% of our citizens, our people are ready to give everything in in the interests of our Motherland... This convinces me once again that Russia is a special country. country and we have special people.”

Senior Lieutenant Dmitriy Vasilets: “It's better to go to jail, but not to commit these acts, not to encourage your subordinates to do it. A lot of people think they don't have a choice. My point is that there is always a choice. It's better to go to jail than than to overstep the bounds of humanity.”

Dmitry Medvedev: “The swindling freaks are wishing death on a daily basis for their their countrymen and their country... Traitors who hate their country that they call for its defeat and destruction, must be regarded as hostis publicus, enemies of society... Such persons should not be allowed back into Russia for the rest of their lives. They should be completely cut off from sources of income in of our country, whatever they may be.”

“OVD-Info: “From 1 January to 14 December 2022, 20,467 political detentions were recorded in Russia detentions on political grounds (including 19,478 detentions after February 24).”

Pope: “Our Ukrainian brothers and sisters are meeting this Christmas in darkness and cold, far from home due to the devastation of 10 months of war. Inspire us to concrete acts of help to all those suffering and enlighten the the minds of those in whose power it is to silence the sound of the cannons and put an immediate end to put an immediate end to this senseless war.”

— Paweł Krawczyk https://krvtz.net/ Fediverse @kravietz@agora.echelon.pl