Nord Stream and “rule of law”
Rulings of the courts in #Italy^1 and #Poland^2 to deny extradition of suspects in Nord Stream bombing case to Germany triggered a specific segment of commentators who complained about “rule of law” somehow degrading in these countries or even “tolerance for terrorism”.
The problem with this argument is that at least the Polish court clearly indicated what is wrong with the German extradition request – it was issued by a country whose elites for decades tolerated #Russia state terrorism in the form of 2014 covert invasion on #Ukraine, and not only tolerated it but actually awarded it by granting the massive Nord Stream profits. And it did so in blatant violation of its own laws, international laws and fundamental values, but let's see how that happened.
European energy disputes with Russia
The fundamental problem was that Putin's Russia never intended to play simple fair trade with Europe – that is, we supply you with gas and oil, you pay money, everyone is happy. If it did, it would simply ratify European Energy Charter Treaty which regulated fair rules for all participants of energy trade, including arbitration of disagreements. Russia never ratified it, because it would hinder its ability to use energy as weapon. As of 2007, Swedish Defense Research Agency counted 55 incidents^3 of Russian violations of large trade contracts, primarily against Eastern European countries. These usually constituted temporary oil pipeline closures under some made-up pretext while making rather aggressive political demands, for example giving away ownership of critical infrastructure companies to Russia in countries such as Belarus, Ukraine, Poland, Moldova or Baltic countries.
The second problem was that European political elites developed a specific doublethink in regard to Russia – a behaviour that would be entirely unimaginable e.g. from other commercial suppliers such as Norway or Quatar, was somehow treated differently when it was exhibited by Russia.
That included absolute lack of transparency of companies such as Gazprom, which was not fixed when they came to Europe, but the other way around – Europe tolerated that these companies were e.g. incorporated in Switzerland. And they continued happy trade with Putin's gas and oil companies, possibly because the disputes mentioned above did not impact them directly. At least, not yet.
All that was accompanied by German elites patronizing everyone else not only about the “energy security” provided by Russia but also about how EU buying fuel from Putin guarantees Russia's stability and peaceful attitude, a political narrative broadly described as Wandel durch Handel. That was most notably expressed by the 2007 speech by Germany's foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier^4
My impression is that, especially in the generation that now, 15 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, bears responsibility in Russia, many –not just President Putin – want to bind Russia closely to Europe. (...)
We want a Russia that prosper and that – based on the values to which Europe is committed and taking into account its own traditions – successfully copes with the change to a stable democracy based on the rule of law. This requires a partnership that goes far beyond oil and gas, that includes our civil societies and that is open to dialogue, even on issues on which we do not always agree. That is why there is no contradiction between our interest in expanding economic relations and compliance with constitutional and human rights standards. Precisely because of our interest in the closest possible exchange with Russia, we will not forego an open word between partners.
As we saw since, Russia indeed did “bind closely too Europe”, just not the way Steinmeier childishly imagined.
Nord Stream 1
The first Nord Stream agreement was signed in 2005 against massive criticism to the Nord Stream AG, whose head was Matthias Warnig, former STASI officer. Shortly after Schröder stepped down and himself jumped on a lucrative position in Nord Stream. Such a blatant political corruption resulted in lukewarm criticism in Germany and some investigations^5 which ended nowhere. There were also many other environmental and ethical concerns and violations raised, all of which were duly dismissed by German government.
So... “rule of law”, they said?
Okay, one could argue Nord Stream 1 happened in the general spirit of Russia-US-EU reset and high hopes that Putin actually will turn towards democracy. But in 2007 Putin did the very opposite – he delivered his infamous, openly hostile 2007 Munich Speech and in 2008 started the Russian invasion on Georgia. Oh, and in the meantime started murdering political opponents in Russia and around Europe (Litvinenko, Politkovskaya and many others).
Nord Stream 2
The argument of “high hopes” was however no longer valid in case of the second pipeline, as it happened after Georgia, during continued series of Russian assassinations, after annexation of Crimea and during Russian limited military intervention in Donbas... and in the middle of a massive EU anti-trust investigation into Gazprom due to its abusive practices.^6
In 2017 investigative reporters drew attention to alleged bribery and opaque payments involving suppliers used on Nord Stream 1 (reporting focused on a German supplier group, offshore companies and Caribbean intermediary payments). German prosecutors were reported to have been alerted / to have opened inquiries into aspects of these allegations. The reporting by Stern/OCCRP painted a picture of complex offshore flows connected with equipment suppliers active during the Nord Stream build.^7 In response, German law enforcement... did nothing.^8
What did they say about “rule of law”, again?
Gerhard Schröder, after he signed key agreements while chancellor, continued to work at Nord Stream and lobbied heavily in Germany for the interests of Russian Federation. Apart from some lukewarm media criticism, no criminal or political investigations had been started against him... until 2022, when the full-scale war started and a state parliamentary inquiry was finally opened against him.^9 But did anything change in the definition of political corruption in Germany between 2005, 2017 and 2022? No, it was just the political climate that prevented such inquires prior to 2022. By the way, Schröder first for months ridiculed the commission by pretending that “burnout syndrome” prevents him from attending it (it did not prevent him from attending other events)^10 and then said he does not regret anything.^11
But the activities most devastating for the German rule of law happened in 2021, when the state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern set up a foundation described as the Climate and Environmental Protection Foundation MV with the stated aim of supporting local measures and, explicitly in some documents, helping completion logistics around the Nord Stream 2 landfall. The foundation accepted significant funding and in public reporting Nord Stream 2-linked money and resources are shown to have been channelled into the foundation. The foundation’s close ties to Nord Stream 2 AG (Gazprom) and its refusal to reveal certain ownership/contract details triggered NGO complaints and parliamentary questions.^12
The German state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern became a gold mine for such cases its minister president Manuela Schwesig ran Gazprom PR through her company and was caught modifying her press statements per instructions from Russia.^13 Schlesig worked with known GRU operative in Germany, Oleg Eremenko^14, and manually intervened in declaratively “independent” report about the above Climate Protection Foundation, erasing paragraphs which implied its harmful activities.^15
In spring 2022 a finance-office employee admitted that she had destroyed original tax documents relating to the Foundation by burning them in her house fireplace. The incident became publicly known as “Kamin-Gate”, fed a major political scandal about the foundation’s ties to Nord Stream 2 donors, and was examined by the state parliamentary investigation committee. The criminal investigation against the civil servant was later discontinued.^16
All of the above should under any rule of law system trigger dozens of criminal and parliamentary investigations. In Germany, almost none happened and if they were reluctantly started, they were closed without any convictions. Where's that much advertised “rule of law” here?
Last but not least, German political circles were always very much concerned about environment, especially as it came to German and French nuclear power plants or gas terminals in Poland. In case of Nord Stream, that concern miraculously disappeared, even when tested in courts. Environmental NGOs (e.g. DUH) brought lawsuits against federal and regional authorities and permitting decisions related to pipeline work in German waters — challenging construction timing (breeding-season restrictions, maritime/avian protections) and approvals granted by the Federal Maritime and Hydrographic Agency (BSH) and local mining/plan authorities. These cases resulted in some delays, but were ultimately all dismissed by German courts.^17
If you think German “rule of law” in environmental protection had just reached it bottom, that was not yet the best part. In 2011 a German environmentalist Jochen Lamp, head of WWF Germany, was also head of Conservation Foundation German Baltic. While WWF headed by Lamp has been actively blocking the project using court cases, Nord Stream reached “an out-of-court agreement” with the Foundation involving transfer of 10 million EUR... after which WWF withdrew the case.^18
“Rule of law”, anyone?
Summary
One could say, in its naive Wandel durch Handel policy Germany believed it will convert Russia to democracy, but as always the opposite process happened – German political elites became infected by Russian corruption and nihilism.
P.S. it must be noted that German foreign minister Johann Wadephul responded to the ruling of the Polish court by simply stating he “respects [it] because we recognise the division of powers”^19
— Paweł Krawczyk https://krvtz.net/ Fediverse @kravietz@agora.echelon.pl