joshim

Evollaqi on natural reading

“A common argument Qur'anis make is that “obey the Messenger” only means 'obey the Message he brought', which means 'only obey the Qur'an'. Or that when we're told to have the Prophet adjudicate our affairs and listen to his instructions, he is only going to adjudicate and instruct based on the Qur'an. Or when we're told to follow the Prophet, this just means follow the Qur'an (as that's only what he's brought and that only what he's living and teaching). Or that purifying us, teaching the wisdom, and other things the Messenger is instructed to do are all just different aspects of giving us the Qur'an, nothing further.

In response one could say, sure, this is all linguistically possible, but it's always possible to say that a reference to a term A is in in fact always exclusively a reference to a term B, as term A is only meant qua term B. B-aloneism is always linguistically possible.

To illustrate this, we could be Sunnah aloneists and read everything in the Qur'an accordingly. We could say “obey God” in the Qur'an exclusively means 'obey the teachings and practices of the human He told us to obey', “follow the Book” doesn't mean 'follow the Book per se' but 'follow the human it grants authority to', and so on. This would be an implausible reading, albeit linguistically possible. And that's the point. A more natural reading of a text we believe is word-for-word perfect and from God is that means what it apparently says, rather than using a number of convoluted synonyms, and adding superfluous words, and leaving out words which would be needed to specify a general statement. The Qur'an doesn't only say obey the Qur'an but “obey God and the Messenger” – suggesting two different sources of speech to be obeyed.”

This was part of a much longer thread going through the arguments for the classical Sunni doctrine. I felt like commenting on this specific point about natural reading. The argument is that to read “obey God and His Messenger” as one obedience is not the natural way to read it, and while linguistically possible, is implausible.

One way to assess this claim is to think about al-tawbah, 9/3:

๏ And an announcement [adhānun] from God and His Messenger to mankind (on the) day of al-ḥaji l-akbar: that God is disassociated of al-mush'rikīn and (so) is His Messenger. So if you repent, then it is good for you. But if you turn away then know that you never escape God. And give tidings of a painful punishment to those who conceal. ๏

Notice that there is only one announcement, adhān, yet it is said to come from God and His Messenger. If the explicit mention of God and His Messenger “suggest[s] two different sources of speech to be obeyed,” how do we understand one adhān coming from them both? Did they make the adhān in unison? Or were they co-authors of the announcement?

No one interprets it like this because the natural reading is that the announcement is God’s and His Messenger delivered it. And I don'’t know of any commentators who thought this phrasing was even worth explaining. So what Evollaqi dismisses an implausible reading is the most natural one here – and arguably any alternative would be implausible. This is evident again in al-anfāl, 8/20:

๏ O you who have believed! Obey God and His Messenger and do not turn away from him [ʿanhu] while you hear. ๏

Traditionists believe it is possible to obey the speech of God but disobey the speech of the Messenger, however, the above verse doesn't seem to see it that way. It identifies both God’s as well as His Messenger’s obedience but ends in the singular pronoun, and not a dual one – “and do not turn back from him while you hear”. The pronoun in the singular is for the Messenger to whom the Believers are asked to listen to attentively.

A final thought about this part:

“A more natural reading of a text we believe is word-for-word perfect and from God is that means what it apparently says, rather than using a number of convoluted synonyms, and adding superfluous words, and leaving out words which would be needed to specify a general statement.”

As is typical in these sorts of polemics, people seem to lose track of their own arguments. Further down the thread, Evollaqi says:

“When the Qur'an says it is enough, in context what it is saying is that it is enough as a miracle – ie that it is enough to evidence the truthfulness of the Prophet saw. He doesn't need to part waters or restore sight to the blind to establish he should be followed.”

So what happened to the text means what it apparently says? The Quran never says it is “enough as a miracle” but it does say its qaṣaṣ are “a detailed explanation [tafṣīla] of all things [kulli shayin] and a guidance and mercy for a people who believe” (yūsuf, 12/111). If contextual reading allows Sunnis to opt for interpretations other than the most apparent meanings of the text, perhaps this is something others are allowed to do too?

Obviously none of this is actually about the language of the Quran. It’s more than just plausible to take ”obey God and His Messenger” as a single obedience, but this reading undermines traditional doctrine – which is what’s really at stake here.

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Tagged: #quranism #tradition #quran

๏ O al-nās! Take guard of your lord, the one who created you from a single self and created from it its like [zawjahā], and dispersed from both of them many rijāl, and nisā. And take guard of God with whom you ask, and the wombs. Indeed God is over you watchful. ๏ — al-nisāa/1.

The opening verse of chapter 4 reminds people that the unified consciousness [nafs] of al-nās has a like [zawj], from which God dispersed people of differing abilities and qualities (i.e. rijāl and nisāa). Several times the Quran mentions al-nās becoming divided, such as in al-baqarah/8, which speaks of those who have become apart from al-nās in faith. Differences among people are thus by design, but this need not result in disunity. The means to attaining harmony between people of different conditions and stations is one of the central themes of chapter 4.

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Verse 11 mentions al-dhakar and al-unthayayn, which are usually read as ‘the male’ and ‘the two females’ respectively. Lane’s lexicon suggests the word dhakar was “probably originally signifying “mentioned,” or “talked of.”” Other entries besides ‘male’ include, “The signification of “strong, courageous, and stubborn,”” and when used to describe iron, denotes “Of the toughest and best quality, and strongest.” (vol. 3, p. 969–970)

Conversely, when untha is used to describe iron, it means “It was, or became, soft.” It can also be used to describe a man who “acted gently in his affair.” (vol. 1, p. 112)

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Verses 11–12 of al-nisāa are traditionally read as instructions for dividing up the estate of a deceased person for purpose of inheritance. But unlike al-māidah/106 where the approach of al-mawt is explicit, the opening passage of al-nisāa doesn’t mention death. Also, there are no commands in verses 11–12; no phrases like “give x” or “take y”. This is noticeable because several command verbs are seen prior to this: verse 1 says ittaqū rabbakum, 2 says ātū l-yatāmā, 3 says inkiḥū mā ṭāba, and so on.

al-nisāa/6–10:

๏ And test the orphans until they reach the agreement. And if you perceive in them uprightness, then defend for them their wealth. And do not consume it in transgression and haste, for they will magnify. And whoever is free of need, then he should refrain, and whoever is poor, then let him consume in a fair manner. So when you defend for them their wealth, bear witness upon them. And sufficient is God as a reckoner. ๏ For the rijāl is a portion of what is left by the parents and the relatives, and for the nisāa is a portion of what is left by the parents and the near relatives. Of what is little from it or much – a portion ordained. ๏ And when is presented the assignment of the relatives and the orphans and the poor, then provide them of it, and speak to them kind words. ๏ And let him fear as those who, if they left behind in succession weak offspring, would fear for them. So let them take guard of God, and let them speak words conclusively. ๏ Indeed, those who consume wealth of the orphans wrongfully, only they consume in their insides fire. And they will be burned in a blaze. ๏

Before this, verse 5 makes a distinction between amwāl and riz’q. Wealth is described as qiyām, an established thing, or means of support, whilst from it the believers are commanded to give riz’q. The above verse goes on to say this should be done suitably, on the basis that those with less need should refrain and those of greater need should consume.

The next verse shifts focus. While riz’q is addressed in a generalised way, and left to the discretion of the community, the defence and protection of amwāl is presented in different terms:

al-nisāa/11:

๏ God makes you concerning your children [awlād] in the male [al-dhakar] a likeness to the good fortune [ḥaẓẓ] of the two females [al-unthayayn]. So if (they) became those left behind [nisāa], (the) greater of them – on them is two thirds what he relinquished. And if she is solitary, then to her is the half. And for his two forefathers [al-abawayhi], to each of them, both, is the sixth in what he relinquished, if there is for him child [walad]. But if there is not for him child, and inherited him his fathers [abawāhu], then to his mother [fali-ummihi] is the third. But if there are for him brothers, then to his mother is the sixth from after an ordinance he made with her, or an acknowledgement. Your fathers and your sons [abnāukum] – you do not know which of them is nearer for you (in) benefit. An obligation from God. Indeed, God is knowing, wise. ๏

As the verse progresses, the proportions get smaller. It is possible the language is rhetorical: like how “marriage is half the dīn,” or “assurance is two thirds of success” are not quantitative in the literal sense. The fractions employed appear symbolic, which would make this verse similar to verses like al-muzzammil/20, where the night is described by the mention of thirds and halves:

๏ Indeed, your lord knows that you establish nearness from the night’s thuluthayi and its niṣ’f, and its thuluth, and a group from those with you. And God measures the night and the day, He has known that you do not enumerate it, so He turned to you. […] ๏

Some of us establish nearness in different portions of the night – this isn’t an instruction to divide up the night into fractions, it is God who measures the night and day. Similarly, when amwāl must change hands, it is not for us to divide it up, rather the Quran assigns weight onto those who are obliged to step forward. Because “your fathers and your sons – you do not know which of them is nearer for you in benefit.”

al-nisāa continues this theme through verses 12–14:

๏ And for you (plural) is half what your kind have relinquished, if not there is for them child. But if there is for them child, then with you (plural) is the fourth about what they gave up, from after an ordinance they made with her, or an acknowledgement. And with them is the fourth of what you relinquished, if there is not for you a child. But if there was for you a child, then with them is the eighth of what you relinquished from after an ordinance you made thereof, or an acknowledgement. And if there is a rajul to be inherited by a kalālat, or an im’ra-at, and for him is a brother or a sister, then with each solitary of the two is the sixth. But if there are greater than that, then they are partners concerning the third, from after an ordinance made thereof, or an acknowledgement without harming. By obligation from God, and God is knowing, forbearing. ๏ These are limits of Gods, and whoever obeys God and His messenger, He admits him to shaded gardens – flows from beneath them the rivers – abiding therein. And that is the great success. ๏ And whoever disobeys God and His messenger and transgresses His limits, He will admit him to fire, to abide therein. And for him is a punishment humiliating. ๏

Verse 12 contrasts you (plural), with your complements or associates. Again, like al-dhakar and al-unthayayn of the verse prior, the distinction between al-nās and their azwāj is not one of sex, but ability, which calls back to the opening verse of the chapter.

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Tagged: #inheritance #tradition #ch004

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๏ She [maryam] said, “My Lord, how can there be for me a child while not has touched me any human?” He said, “Thus God creates what He wills. When He decrees a matter then only He says to it, ‘Be’ and it becomes. ๏ — al-ʿim’rān/47

This is understood to mean maryam miraculously became pregnant and Prophet ʿīsā had no father. But what if “kun fayakūn” here means that God willed that maryam would meet a man and then become pregnant?

The story of the birth of Prophet ʿīsā is mentioned twice in the Quran, once in al-ʿim’rān and then in maryam, and both times preceded by the story of the birth of Prophet yaḥyā:

๏ He [zakariyyā] said, “My Lord, how can there be for me a young one, while verily has reached me the old age and my wife is barren?” He said, “Thus God does what He wills.” ๏ – al-ʿim’rān/40

If the logic traditionally used in the story of ʿīsā were applied to this verse, we would have to conclude that the Prophet yaḥyā had neither father nor mother.

No one believes Prophet yaḥyā fell from the sky, so we can see how the classical interpretation fills the gaps in this story in a way it does not with the story of ʿīsā, even though the two accounts appear side by side in the Quran.

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Tagged: #prophets #tradition #ch003 #ch019

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Those who support abortion rights in some form should be prepared to argue their case on the terrain that pro-lifers have traditionally claimed as their own: the apparent right to life (or lack thereof) of a human fetus during pregnancy. Continuing to assert a woman’s bodily autonomy is unlikely to progress the abortion debate, because very few people dispute that women should be in charge of their bodies. 1

The question should be, what is the right to life of a fetus during the mother’s painful, injurious, and potentially fatal process of pregnancy and birthing? It is usually implicit that after a certain point the life of the fetus is more important than any pain or suffering the woman might suffer, but leaving this unexamined is unsatisfactory. To compel a woman to go through this process demands some serious explaining, even if we take the preservation of life argument to be correct.

From an Islamic perspective, it seems to me the principle of preserving life isn’t applied consistently. Consider something like donating blood, which is not compulsory:

“From a Shariah perspective, it will not be permissible for one to sell his/her blood to the [blood] bank; rather it must be donated freely.”

A situation where there are no blood donations will certainly lead to avoidable deaths. Why then is it left to be donated freely? Surely the shariah must compel a man to surrender his insides, in this case his blood supply, to save the life of another, in the same way it compels a woman to surrender her insides for the life of another.

That’s not exactly a like-for-like, but the point is about what we are prepared to demand of each other. The consequences of what is demanded of women should be addressed explicitly when arguing for the rights of the fetus. Although it is largely ignored, the pain and suffering of women is morally significant. Society owes itself to women who steel themselves to get through pregnancy and birthing. And this should guide us in how we treat women who feel they can’t go through with it.

๏ …And take guard of God with whom you ask, and the wombs. Indeed God is over you, watchful. ๏ — al-nisāa/1

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Tagged: #abortion #women

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Much of the moral arguments found in the Quran assume we have the ability to recognise faḥshā when we see or experience it. al-aʿrāf:33 even says that God only restricts us in al-fawāḥisha. So if same-sex relationships are forbidden, it must be because they are immoral, and this should be evident. If not immediately, then at least after examination and reflection. It’s from this angle that I think the classical shariah position on homosexuality can be questioned, because it doesn’t persuasively make the case that homosexual relationships are immoral.

For example, the argument that homosexual sex is a perversion and abuse of bodily organs and orifices isn’t based on the Quran, which never speaks of the telos of specific body organs or orifices. Other justifications, such as the argument that legitimising homosexual relationships will destabilise traditional marriage, or that it could lead to other social ills, are not compelling. If homosexual relationships cannot be shown to be immoral, why then would they be forbidden? Potentially, the shariah could allow for them. Consider al-rūm:21,

๏ And from His signs is that He created partners for you from yourselves. That you may find tranquillity in them, and He placed between you love and mercy. Indeed, in that are surely signs for people who reflect. ๏

The verse doesn’t say our partners must be of the opposite sex – healthy relationships are built on mutual feelings of tranquillity, love and mercy. “Your tongues and colours,” says the next verse, are from God’s signs. Echoed again in the imagery of fāṭir:27–28, the vastness of human diversity is likened to the colours and textures of mountains, fruits and living creatures. This should give pause for thought before a blanket exclusion of diversity in sexuality is pursued, given how integral sexuality is to the human condition.

A Quranic basis for homosexual relationships can be built from these verses, provided those which are typically used to oppose them are accounted for. Such as the story of Prophet Lut and his people, which is traditionally read as a strong condemnation of male homosexuality. I won’t reproduce an alternative interpretation here in full, but just to give an example of how one can begin to form, consider al-anʿām:139. This verse is not directly related to the story of Prophet Lut, but its language is instructive:

๏ And they say, “Whatever is within these pleasant things is only for our males [dhukūr] and forbidden for our azwāj! […]” ๏

The people granted privileges and pleasures to their males and wilfully neglected their complementary azwāj. This isn’t an example of homosexuality or sexual deviancy, but a blatant display of sexism. This can be linked to al-shuʿarā:165–166 where Prophet Lut admonishes his community:

๏ Do you bring forth the males [al-dhuk’rān] from the worlds, and forsake what your Lord created for you of your azwāj? Rather, you are a transgressing community! ๏

There is an obvious similarity. Lut’s people could be described as male supremacists – they favoured and sought to elevate the males while they neglected and oppressed women. The other verses of the story can also be interpreted in this light, which shifts the message away from homosexuality entirely.

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Tagged: #homosexuality #tradition #shariah

If group rights exist, then a group has the right to determine the character and destiny of its collective life. This is one of the arguments presented in the Group Rights entry at Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, where a “conception of group rights that is moral in foundation and that might be used to determine what legal rights groups should have,” is explored. We typically see the right of collective self-determination exercised by ethnic and racial groups, political parties, trade unions etc. For example, where this right applies to a religious group, it is free to engage in collective expressions of its faith and that its sacred sites and symbols should not be desecrated.

“It is enough that we have reason to regard a group as an object of moral concern; a group does not have to be a moral agent to be a moral patient. Even if a group is capable of moral agency, not all of its rights need concern or presuppose its agency. Thus Keith Graham points out that we can and do apply a range of moral epithets to groups: groups can be treated justly or unjustly, they can be deceived and treated offensively, and they can flourish more or less well (2002, 89–93). Thinking about groups in this way implies that they have moral status and that we can reasonably ascribe rights to them. For May (1987), McDonald (1991) and Sheehy (2006) the critical consideration is that a group can have interests as a group—interests that are more than the aggregated interests of its individual members. That is why a group is capable of being harmed and of being treated unjustly as a group. In the case of groups, as in the case of individuals, we may think of those harms and injustices as violations of rights (cf. Simon 1995, 2001).”

The social category and group ‘women’ would qualify as an object of moral concern. While individual women do not all think alike, have the same experiences or desires, nor does the group itself function like a political party or trade union etc. it is a group which is treated unjustly, offensively and does not flourish well under current circumstances.

One such injustice is that the group’s right to define and maintain its own boundaries is being denied. This is happening by way of transgenderism. For a male to identify as a woman, and for this to be validated, ‘women’ must go through a process of abstraction to change from “adult human females” to something that can include males who desire to identify as women. By imposing a change to the boundaries of the group, by making women an entirely permeable concept, the right of women to determine the character of its collective life is denied. And we know through simple observation that this is an imposition rather than an organic change from within the group: the overwhelming majority of women in the world are not involved in these discussions. What’s more, it is exactly because the group is treated offensively that a definition which in no way serves its interests can be imposed on it.

๏ O you who have believed! Do not go into houses other than your own houses, until you have perceived and inclined in peace towards its folk; that is better for you so that you may remember. But if you do not find anyone therein, do not enter it until permission has been granted to you. And if it is said to you, “Go back,” then go back; it is purer for you. And God is knowing of what you do. ๏ — al-nūr:27–28

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Tagged: #transgenderism #gender

In the essay, Ethical Foundation of Islamic Economics, S.N.H. Naqvi outlines the ethical axioms which would serve as a base for a modern Islamic economy. These are unity, equilibrium, free will, and responsibility. All economic instruments/mechanisms must foster and respect each of these principles. However, given we have no post-industrial example of an Islamic economy based on this ethic, he is careful to add a caveat:

“It may turn out that the set of axioms…is smaller and may, therefore, be enlarged by adding more axioms to the set.…Also, in this case the axiom system…will constitute only necessary but not sufficient conditions for a truly Islamic economic order. The reverse possibility of the 'contraction' of the existing criteria set can also not be ruled out.”

So it’s not certain which axioms are necessary for an economy to be Islamic. Nonetheless, Naqvi is sure that an Islamic economy is market based, allows private ownership of property, including capital and the means of production, and allows for landlordism and wage labour.

The essay notes that in capitalist systems, “the individual in such societies is almost entirely attuned to grabbing rather than giving.” This, in part, comes from fear of the unseen. And according to Naqvi:

“Islam minimizes fear by making man to rely on God’s Mercy. The Qur’ān is explicit: “Say, O My Slaves who have been prodigal to their own hurt: Despair not of the Mercy of Allah, who forgiveth all sins. Lo! He is the Forgiving and Merciful”. (39:53). This soul-lifting verse destroys in one sweep fear and awakens hope…”

This is an example of how the ‘spiritual aspect’ of Islamic economics is supposed to set it apart from other systems. But given that it’s even necessary to theorise what an Islamic economy might look like, suggests Naqvi is overly optimistic about the effect spirituality has in influencing economics. If Islamic spirituality is the unique regulating element of an economy, unseen in capitalism, wouldn’t people in Muslim majority countries be voluntarily rejecting the excesses of capitalism now, as per Quranic guidance?

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In essence, Naqvi and other theorists accept capitalist systems, but believe the justice of the Islamic system lies in its mechanisms for distribution of wealth. One example is Islam’s inheritance laws. These laws require a person’s estate to be divided amongst family and relatives at death, reducing the power base of the institution of private property. Business ventures are liquidated or dissolved at death as well. There is historical evidence to show that this can actually prevent wealth from concentrating in the hands of the few, however this also has implications for economic growth:

“Islamic partnerships and inheritance law limited the ability of merchants to pool capital and build competitive enterprises with long life spans. Islam’s emphasis on fairness and a division of assets among children had the unfortunate effect of preventing large-scale businesses from taking root.” x

This is important because one of the main objectives of an Islamic economy according to Naqvi is economic growth. A stagnant economy – one where there is little or slow growth – implies wealth is not moving around. It’s difficult to see how in modern markets growth can happen without entrepreneurs being able to incorporate. This goes unanswered in Naqvi’s essay.

Not allowing entrepreneurs to incorporate puts the onus back on the state to take on projects which require large capital investments. The state is the only entity with longevity and access to extensive resources, either from tax revenues or by sourcing capital via a state/central bank. And this highlights a common thread in theories of Islamic economics. The only practical way of preventing the excesses of capitalism is not through spirituality, but state intervention. The state becomes a locus of power because it must oversee and intervene in so many aspects of the economy.

This is at odds with the more libertarian attitude of classical scholars, who believed the state should not interfere too much with people’s daily lives. As Naqvi notes, “An undue concentration of economic power in the hands of the state also upsets social equilibrium, and negates human freedom.” But he also concedes that in an Islamic economy there must be a “considerable degree of state control of the economy through fiscal, monetary and other economic policies.” How considerable is considerable?

Evidently the balance between the ethical principles of an Islamic system and the economic mechanisms needed for it to function as a modern economy is tricky. While there is heavy dependency on the state to correct the inherent problems of capitalist structures, the possible interventions available to an Islamic state are limited – many of which are already in play in modern mixed economies today. Such as inheritance taxes, minimum wage, social security and trade laws etc. all of which are designed to bring about some form of social equity. So the common mantra that Islam is neither communist or capitalist, but a unique third way, doesn’t ring true.

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Tagged: #IslamicEconomics #Naqvi

According to the paper Out of Sight and Therefore Out of Mind: Early Sunnī Islamic Modesty Regulations and the Creation of Spheres of Privacy, [^1] the fitna principle was not the primary concern of scholars who sought to regulate women’s dress. Rather, “by regulating physical and visual access to women’s bodies and by restricting the flow of sensitive information about them, Islamic law allowed people (primarily the male members of a woman’s family) to protect and control their social image and public reputation.” This was because:

“In classical Islamic society, as in many other societies, the reputation of a person and his or her family was a valuable and crucial asset in various areas of life. Thus, for example, a person’s reputation would affect his or her ability to forge economic and social relations and would determine a person’s trustworthiness for the purpose of testifying in court. Damage to a person’s good name could result in social ostracism and economic destruction. In early Islamic society, as in later periods, a family’s honor and reputation were linked to, among other things, the chastity of its women.”

The essay points to the fact that slave women were allowed to expose much of their bodies in public spaces because their chastity had no bearing on the reputation of their masters. This is noteworthy since “bodies of slave girls were not, by definition, less arousing than those of free women.”

Aside from challenging the view that women’s bodies are pudendal, hence sexually corrupting to those who see them, this also challenges the common belief that female veiling is obligatory by divine decree, and never up for interpretation. If it is a compulsory act of ʿibādat, why was it dependent on social status?

Historically, modesty regulations were subject to change:

“Moreover, modesty regulations suggest that scholars throughout the classical period were practical, and not completely doctrinaire, in determining what constitutes appropriate exposure of a person. They adjusted the modesty restrictions they imposed in accordance with what their society defined as a) each gender’s daily tasks and b) what constituted normal exposure between men and women.”

So what would Islamic modesty regulations look like today were this process to continue? The emphasis on female veiling would perhaps change significantly in a society which rejects the culture of placing undue focus on the chastity of a woman and linking the reputation of her family to her appearance.

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Tagged: #tradition #women #veiling #modesty

Notes:

[^1]: Alshech, E. (2007). Out of Sight and Therefore Out of Mind: Early Sunnī Islamic Modesty Regulations and the Creation of Spheres of Privacy. Journal of Near Eastern Studies, 66(4), 267-290. doi:10.1086/524180.

“Slave ownership was not only for the filthy rich, though, and the jurists identified with slaveholders rather than with slaves. Some owned at least one enslaved concubine; both Shāfiʿī and Ibn Ḥanbal died leaving concubines who had borne them children (umm walads). One report declares that Mālik ibn Anas “purchased three hundred sarārī [concubines] and would spend one night a year with each of them.” Even if, as is likely, this report exaggerates, it makes clear that concubinage was a normal part of the sociosexual patterns of life in this era, as was domestic servitude more generally. Shāfiʿī – by no means a wealthy man – apparently had in his household two adolescent male slaves as well as an Andalusian wet nurse, who nursed the child born to his slave concubine. Stories about Mālik refer to a black female slave who answered knocks at his gate. In addition to illustrating the widespread nature of slaveholding, these anecdotes help us remember that their own status as slaveholders cannot help but have influenced the jurists’ rulings.”

— Kecia Ali, (Marriage and slavery in early Islam, 2010, p. 22)

The Quran opposes the subjugation of people in plain terms. al-aʿrāf, 7/157 mentions the nabiy who “lift[s] from them their burdens and the shackles that were upon them.” al-nisāa, 4/19 forbids the believers to “inherit the nisā against their will.” al-nisāa, 4/75 says: “And how could you refuse to fight in the cause of God and of the utterly helpless men and women and children who are crying, “O our Sustainer! Lead us forth [to freedom] out of this land whose people are oppressors...”” In spite of this, slavery persisted throughout Islamic history. Dr. Ali also quotes the Hanafi jurist Muhammad ‘Ala al-Din Haskafi saying, “A free man may marry four free women and female slaves, not more, and he may take as many concubines as he wishes from among his female slaves.” (Sexual Ethics and Islam, 2006, p. 39) Haskafi lived in the seventeenth century, which suggests the view of many Muslims today – that Islam came to phase out slavery – wasn’t one shared by the scholars of the past. They were still justifying and regulating the practice hundreds of years after the Prophet passed away.

I do mention this from time to time, but not to hang over the heads of Muslims or to make people uncomfortable. There is no moral justification for sex-slavery, so I think the legitimate status of concubinage in Islam’s past has far reaching consequences for how we view the role of tradition in actualising Islam today. While few Muslims today would condone sex-slavery, many do insist that the role of women must be defined by the same classical sources which allowed concubinage. Pro-concubine rulings of the classical scholars are divorced from their other rulings regarding women, essentially keeping the overall fiqh of women intact.

The problem with this is that the classical scholars would have viewed their legal thinking as unified, each ruling in sync with other rulings, each being in harmony with a wider Islamic ethic. The world-view which informed their views of concubinage also informed their views of hierarchies and women in general. Of course, it’s possible to isolate one particular practice from a tradition and discard it without the whole thing collapsing; the Sunnah didn’t die along with the institution of slavery. But if the classical jurists believed slave women could be used for sex, while free women must be covered from head to toe, it’s reasonable to examine what the relationship between these two rulings are. Did the moral arguments used to arrive at the former feature in the latter? If yes, is the latter morally questionable like the former?

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Tagged: #sunnah #women #tradition #slavery

“A word about feminism and the notion that the type of it being advocated by Muslim women is one that advocates for getting their God-given rights. […]

If any Muslim wants to talk about God-given rights, the way to do that is by…cit[ing] verses from the Quran and Hadiths of the Beloved ﷺ. Advocate from within OUR sources, which we believe transcend everything. I’ve yet to see any Muslim have a problem with Muslim women who challenge the status quo using the Quran and Sunnah of the Beloved ﷺ. If you take an objective look at all the resistance you see against feminism, you’ll see it’s directed at a discourse devoid of these sources. In fact, a significant part of the discourse being resisted and some of its loudest voices aren’t just devoid of the Quran and Sunnah, they’re flat out challenging them as “patriarchal” or “unjust” since they don’t advocate for equality in terms of sameness between men and women.

I think the way forward is to first of all sort out to what degree we’ve adopted a colonized mindset and believed the Western mantra about us. Then we need to get back to our own sources and use them to get our act together in terms of our own cosmology and belief system. We don’t need feminism, of any kind, to deal with the various problems Muslim women have in their relationship with Muslim men. Instead of mastering feminist theory and attempting to “Islamize” it, master the Quran and Sunnah and Islamize your life.” x

This was interesting to me only because of who said it. Mohamed Ghilan is a vegan.

He states his case for veganism in this essay. In brief, he argues that today’s mass meat consumption and capitalism-driven consumerism inflicts widespread cruelty upon animals, and is causing environmental degradation across the planet. Veganism addresses this, and so its adoption is not merely a good but a “Sunnah imperative.” To realise the ethics of Islam to its fullest, we should take the examples of what the Prophet did from the texts and build on them to deal with contemporary problems by asking: “What would the Habeeb do?” So while veganism has no precedence in Islamic history, it is entirely within the spirit of the Sunnah.

For me, this invites the question, how does a person who “Islamized” veganism in this way tell other Muslims to make no attempt to do the same with feminism?

Dr. Ghilan’s call to Muslims to go back to their sources instead of looking to feminism is similar to reactions to his own veganism-as-Sunnah position. Some readers pointed out that the Prophet consumed meat and that if Muslims are to pursue environmental activism, it should be through implementing the Sunnah as per the classical texts, not by looking to secular politics for guidance. In a follow-up podcast, Dr. Ghilan responds to this point directly:

“I included in the article relevant Hadiths on Al Habeeb ﷺ’s eating habits, and for the brothers and sisters who were so quick to point out that he ﷺ loved shoulder meat from sheep I have to ask a question: given that part of Al Habeeb ﷺ’s diet was to sometimes not have meat for weeks at a time, and this was done deliberately on his part as Lady Aisha RA stated, when was the last time you could say you haven’t had meat for a few weeks? In fact, most of us have meat not once, but at least twice per day on a regular basis. If we were really trying to champion the Sunnah in our diets, we wouldn’t selectively quote Hadiths about what type of meat the Beloved ﷺ loved most. Rather than abusing the Sunnah to justify our gluttony, we would use the Sunnah and fast Mondays and Thursdays; we would deliberately go hungry sometimes without needing to; we would eat only few morsels of food to keep our backs straight; and we would at the very least be following a semi-vegetarian diet where we abstain from consuming meat for a few weeks at a time. This right here is the bare minimum application of the Sunnah, where we concern ourselves with only ourselves, and not take into account the interconnectedness of the world in which we find ourselves living in.”

It’s not difficult to see how this line of reasoning might apply to conversations around sex-group dynamics as well. Do men who cite the textual sources to oppose feminism treat and engage with women in the way the Prophet did? Do they actually champion the Sunnah, or is the Sunnah cited as a way to shut women down and maintain the status quo? Muslim feminists can demonstrate without much difficulty how Muslim communities fail in “the bare minimum application of the Sunnah” in their treatment of women.

When it comes to the environmental agenda, one of the reasons Dr. Ghilan thinks veganism is justified is that the material conditions from the time of the Prophet have changed:

“But here’s the rub. Before the industrial revolution and the rise of modern cities, people lived organically as part of nature. There was an innate understanding and maintenance of balance. There was no production and distribution of food at industrial levels and a systematic hiding of how it impacts the Earth.”

The suggestion is that even if the majority of Muslims did apply the historical and text based Sunnah to their lives, it would not achieve the same balance with nature that the early Muslim community enjoyed. Fasting on Mondays and Thursdays at this point would have a limited impact on deforestation of the Amazon, so we must explore additional actions. And again, it should be obvious how this argument could work in other contexts. The objectification, sexualisation and pornification of women is a lucrative, global industry, a development of globalisation, unknown during the time of the Prophet. As is the sheer scale of the international trafficking of girls and women. And from figures gathered by UNICEF in 2014, “around 120 million girls worldwide (slightly more than 1 in 10) have experienced forced intercourse or other forced sexual acts at some point in their lives.” These realities represent a change, shift and intensification in the material conditions faced by girls and women from what was known in the times of the Prophet.

It might be that Dr. Ghilan doesn’t see the parallels, or doesn’t think there is a systemic element to female oppression in the way he understands to be the case with global environmental damage. Or maybe he does – his claim that Muslims do not need feminism “to deal with the various problems Muslim women have in their relationship with Muslim men,” seems carefully worded. It implies the problems Muslim women have with Muslim men can be separated and dealt with independently from wider problems that women have the world over. Even if this were the case, by his own admission Muslims must concern themselves with the balance the Divine intended for humankind, not just the balance between Muslims.

So we should be asking questions like, what would the Habeeb do if he knew that according to Amartyan Sen the killing of girls is the greatest act of murder in history. Sen estimated in the 90s that there was at least one hundred million women missing from the world. One hundred million – aborted before birth, killed in infancy, or dead through differential parental treatment, across the world.

None of this is to say that if you agree with veganism you must also agree with feminism. But, given the careful consideration Dr. Ghilan gives to a political movement with no Islamic precedence with the aim to tackle a structural problem that affects us all, you would think he would be more open and sympathetic to others who attempt the same.

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Tagged: #islam #mohamedghilan #feminism #sunnah

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