Evollaqi on natural reading

“A common argument Qur'anis make is that “obey the Messenger” only means 'obey the Message he brought', which means 'only obey the Qur'an'. Or that when we're told to have the Prophet adjudicate our affairs and listen to his instructions, he is only going to adjudicate and instruct based on the Qur'an. Or when we're told to follow the Prophet, this just means follow the Qur'an (as that's only what he's brought and that only what he's living and teaching). Or that purifying us, teaching the wisdom, and other things the Messenger is instructed to do are all just different aspects of giving us the Qur'an, nothing further.

In response one could say, sure, this is all linguistically possible, but it's always possible to say that a reference to a term A is in in fact always exclusively a reference to a term B, as term A is only meant qua term B. B-aloneism is always linguistically possible.

To illustrate this, we could be Sunnah aloneists and read everything in the Qur'an accordingly. We could say “obey God” in the Qur'an exclusively means 'obey the teachings and practices of the human He told us to obey', “follow the Book” doesn't mean 'follow the Book per se' but 'follow the human it grants authority to', and so on. This would be an implausible reading, albeit linguistically possible. And that's the point. A more natural reading of a text we believe is word-for-word perfect and from God is that means what it apparently says, rather than using a number of convoluted synonyms, and adding superfluous words, and leaving out words which would be needed to specify a general statement. The Qur'an doesn't only say obey the Qur'an but “obey God and the Messenger” – suggesting two different sources of speech to be obeyed.”

This was part of a much longer thread going through the arguments for the classical Sunni doctrine. I felt like commenting on this specific point about natural reading. The argument is that to read “obey God and His Messenger” as one obedience is not the natural way to read it, and while linguistically possible, is implausible.

One way to assess this claim is to think about al-tawbah, 9/3:

๏ And an announcement [adhānun] from God and His Messenger to mankind (on the) day of al-ḥaji l-akbar: that God is disassociated of al-mush'rikīn and (so) is His Messenger. So if you repent, then it is good for you. But if you turn away then know that you never escape God. And give tidings of a painful punishment to those who conceal. ๏

Notice that there is only one announcement, adhān, yet it is said to come from God and His Messenger. If the explicit mention of God and His Messenger “suggest[s] two different sources of speech to be obeyed,” how do we understand one adhān coming from them both? Did they make the adhān in unison? Or were they co-authors of the announcement?

No one interprets it like this because the natural reading is that the announcement is God’s and His Messenger delivered it. And I don'’t know of any commentators who thought this phrasing was even worth explaining. So what Evollaqi dismisses an implausible reading is the most natural one here – and arguably any alternative would be implausible. This is evident again in al-anfāl, 8/20:

๏ O you who have believed! Obey God and His Messenger and do not turn away from him [ʿanhu] while you hear. ๏

Traditionists believe it is possible to obey the speech of God but disobey the speech of the Messenger, however, the above verse doesn't seem to see it that way. It identifies both God’s as well as His Messenger’s obedience but ends in the singular pronoun, and not a dual one – “and do not turn back from him while you hear”. The pronoun in the singular is for the Messenger to whom the Believers are asked to listen to attentively.

A final thought about this part:

“A more natural reading of a text we believe is word-for-word perfect and from God is that means what it apparently says, rather than using a number of convoluted synonyms, and adding superfluous words, and leaving out words which would be needed to specify a general statement.”

As is typical in these sorts of polemics, people seem to lose track of their own arguments. Further down the thread, Evollaqi says:

“When the Qur'an says it is enough, in context what it is saying is that it is enough as a miracle – ie that it is enough to evidence the truthfulness of the Prophet saw. He doesn't need to part waters or restore sight to the blind to establish he should be followed.”

So what happened to the text means what it apparently says? The Quran never says it is “enough as a miracle” but it does say its qaṣaṣ are “a detailed explanation [tafṣīla] of all things [kulli shayin] and a guidance and mercy for a people who believe” (yūsuf, 12/111). If contextual reading allows Sunnis to opt for interpretations other than the most apparent meanings of the text, perhaps this is something others are allowed to do too?

Obviously none of this is actually about the language of the Quran. It’s more than just plausible to take ”obey God and His Messenger” as a single obedience, but this reading undermines traditional doctrine – which is what’s really at stake here.

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Tagged: #quranism #tradition #quran

๏ O al-nās! Take guard of your lord, the one who created you from a single self and created from it its like [zawjahā], and dispersed from both of them many rijāl, and nisā. And take guard of God with whom you ask, and the wombs. Indeed God is over you watchful. ๏ — al-nisāa/1.

The opening verse of chapter 4 reminds people that the unified consciousness [nafs] of al-nās has a like [zawj], from which God dispersed people of differing abilities and qualities (i.e. rijāl and nisāa). Several times the Quran mentions al-nās becoming divided, such as in al-baqarah/8, which speaks of those who have become apart from al-nās in faith. Differences among people are thus by design, but this need not result in disunity. The means to attaining harmony between people of different conditions and stations is one of the central themes of chapter 4.

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Verse 11 mentions al-dhakar and al-unthayayn, which are usually read as ‘the male’ and ‘the two females’ respectively. Lane’s lexicon suggests the word dhakar was “probably originally signifying “mentioned,” or “talked of.”” Other entries besides ‘male’ include, “The signification of “strong, courageous, and stubborn,”” and when used to describe iron, denotes “Of the toughest and best quality, and strongest.” (vol. 3, p. 969–970)

Conversely, when untha is used to describe iron, it means “It was, or became, soft.” It can also be used to describe a man who “acted gently in his affair.” (vol. 1, p. 112)

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Verses 11–12 of al-nisāa are traditionally read as instructions for dividing up the estate of a deceased person for purpose of inheritance. But unlike al-māidah/106 where the approach of al-mawt is explicit, the opening passage of al-nisāa doesn’t mention death. Also, there are no commands in verses 11–12; no phrases like “give x” or “take y”. This is noticeable because several command verbs are seen prior to this: verse 1 says ittaqū rabbakum, 2 says ātū l-yatāmā, 3 says inkiḥū mā ṭāba, and so on.

al-nisāa/6–10:

๏ And test the orphans until they reach the agreement. And if you perceive in them uprightness, then defend for them their wealth. And do not consume it in transgression and haste, for they will magnify. And whoever is free of need, then he should refrain, and whoever is poor, then let him consume in a fair manner. So when you defend for them their wealth, bear witness upon them. And sufficient is God as a reckoner. ๏ For the rijāl is a portion of what is left by the parents and the relatives, and for the nisāa is a portion of what is left by the parents and the near relatives. Of what is little from it or much – a portion ordained. ๏ And when is presented the assignment of the relatives and the orphans and the poor, then provide them of it, and speak to them kind words. ๏ And let him fear as those who, if they left behind in succession weak offspring, would fear for them. So let them take guard of God, and let them speak words conclusively. ๏ Indeed, those who consume wealth of the orphans wrongfully, only they consume in their insides fire. And they will be burned in a blaze. ๏

Before this, verse 5 makes a distinction between amwāl and riz’q. Wealth is described as qiyām, an established thing, or means of support, whilst from it the believers are commanded to give riz’q. The above verse goes on to say this should be done suitably, on the basis that those with less need should refrain and those of greater need should consume.

The next verse shifts focus. While riz’q is addressed in a generalised way, and left to the discretion of the community, the defence and protection of amwāl is presented in different terms:

al-nisāa/11:

๏ God makes you concerning your children [awlād] in the male [al-dhakar] a likeness to the good fortune [ḥaẓẓ] of the two females [al-unthayayn]. So if (they) became those left behind [nisāa], (the) greater of them – on them is two thirds what he relinquished. And if she is solitary, then to her is the half. And for his two forefathers [al-abawayhi], to each of them, both, is the sixth in what he relinquished, if there is for him child [walad]. But if there is not for him child, and inherited him his fathers [abawāhu], then to his mother [fali-ummihi] is the third. But if there are for him brothers, then to his mother is the sixth from after an ordinance he made with her, or an acknowledgement. Your fathers and your sons [abnāukum] – you do not know which of them is nearer for you (in) benefit. An obligation from God. Indeed, God is knowing, wise. ๏

As the verse progresses, the proportions get smaller. It is possible the language is rhetorical: like how “marriage is half the dīn,” or “assurance is two thirds of success” are not quantitative in the literal sense. The fractions employed appear symbolic, which would make this verse similar to verses like al-muzzammil/20, where the night is described by the mention of thirds and halves:

๏ Indeed, your lord knows that you establish nearness from the night’s thuluthayi and its niṣ’f, and its thuluth, and a group from those with you. And God measures the night and the day, He has known that you do not enumerate it, so He turned to you. […] ๏

Some of us establish nearness in different portions of the night – this isn’t an instruction to divide up the night into fractions, it is God who measures the night and day. Similarly, when amwāl must change hands, it is not for us to divide it up, rather the Quran assigns weight onto those who are obliged to step forward. Because “your fathers and your sons – you do not know which of them is nearer for you in benefit.”

al-nisāa continues this theme through verses 12–14:

๏ And for you (plural) is half what your kind have relinquished, if not there is for them child. But if there is for them child, then with you (plural) is the fourth about what they gave up, from after an ordinance they made with her, or an acknowledgement. And with them is the fourth of what you relinquished, if there is not for you a child. But if there was for you a child, then with them is the eighth of what you relinquished from after an ordinance you made thereof, or an acknowledgement. And if there is a rajul to be inherited by a kalālat, or an im’ra-at, and for him is a brother or a sister, then with each solitary of the two is the sixth. But if there are greater than that, then they are partners concerning the third, from after an ordinance made thereof, or an acknowledgement without harming. By obligation from God, and God is knowing, forbearing. ๏ These are limits of Gods, and whoever obeys God and His messenger, He admits him to shaded gardens – flows from beneath them the rivers – abiding therein. And that is the great success. ๏ And whoever disobeys God and His messenger and transgresses His limits, He will admit him to fire, to abide therein. And for him is a punishment humiliating. ๏

Verse 12 contrasts you (plural), with your complements or associates. Again, like al-dhakar and al-unthayayn of the verse prior, the distinction between al-nās and their azwāj is not one of sex, but ability, which calls back to the opening verse of the chapter.

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Tagged: #inheritance #tradition #ch004

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๏ She [maryam] said, “My Lord, how can there be for me a child while not has touched me any human?” He said, “Thus God creates what He wills. When He decrees a matter then only He says to it, ‘Be’ and it becomes. ๏ — al-ʿim’rān/47

This is understood to mean maryam miraculously became pregnant and Prophet ʿīsā had no father. But what if “kun fayakūn” here means that God willed that maryam would meet a man and then become pregnant?

The story of the birth of Prophet ʿīsā is mentioned twice in the Quran, once in al-ʿim’rān and then in maryam, and both times preceded by the story of the birth of Prophet yaḥyā:

๏ He [zakariyyā] said, “My Lord, how can there be for me a young one, while verily has reached me the old age and my wife is barren?” He said, “Thus God does what He wills.” ๏ – al-ʿim’rān/40

If the logic traditionally used in the story of ʿīsā were applied to this verse, we would have to conclude that the Prophet yaḥyā had neither father nor mother.

No one believes Prophet yaḥyā fell from the sky, so we can see how the classical interpretation fills the gaps in this story in a way it does not with the story of ʿīsā, even though the two accounts appear side by side in the Quran.

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Tagged: #prophets #tradition #ch003 #ch019

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Much of the moral arguments found in the Quran assume we have the ability to recognise faḥshā when we see or experience it. al-aʿrāf:33 even says that God only restricts us in al-fawāḥisha. So if same-sex relationships are forbidden, it must be because they are immoral, and this should be evident. If not immediately, then at least after examination and reflection. It’s from this angle that I think the classical shariah position on homosexuality can be questioned, because it doesn’t persuasively make the case that homosexual relationships are immoral.

For example, the argument that homosexual sex is a perversion and abuse of bodily organs and orifices isn’t based on the Quran, which never speaks of the telos of specific body organs or orifices. Other justifications, such as the argument that legitimising homosexual relationships will destabilise traditional marriage, or that it could lead to other social ills, are not compelling. If homosexual relationships cannot be shown to be immoral, why then would they be forbidden? Potentially, the shariah could allow for them. Consider al-rūm:21,

๏ And from His signs is that He created partners for you from yourselves. That you may find tranquillity in them, and He placed between you love and mercy. Indeed, in that are surely signs for people who reflect. ๏

The verse doesn’t say our partners must be of the opposite sex – healthy relationships are built on mutual feelings of tranquillity, love and mercy. “Your tongues and colours,” says the next verse, are from God’s signs. Echoed again in the imagery of fāṭir:27–28, the vastness of human diversity is likened to the colours and textures of mountains, fruits and living creatures. This should give pause for thought before a blanket exclusion of diversity in sexuality is pursued, given how integral sexuality is to the human condition.

A Quranic basis for homosexual relationships can be built from these verses, provided those which are typically used to oppose them are accounted for. Such as the story of Prophet Lut and his people, which is traditionally read as a strong condemnation of male homosexuality. I won’t reproduce an alternative interpretation here in full, but just to give an example of how one can begin to form, consider al-anʿām:139. This verse is not directly related to the story of Prophet Lut, but its language is instructive:

๏ And they say, “Whatever is within these pleasant things is only for our males [dhukūr] and forbidden for our azwāj! […]” ๏

The people granted privileges and pleasures to their males and wilfully neglected their complementary azwāj. This isn’t an example of homosexuality or sexual deviancy, but a blatant display of sexism. This can be linked to al-shuʿarā:165–166 where Prophet Lut admonishes his community:

๏ Do you bring forth the males [al-dhuk’rān] from the worlds, and forsake what your Lord created for you of your azwāj? Rather, you are a transgressing community! ๏

There is an obvious similarity. Lut’s people could be described as male supremacists – they favoured and sought to elevate the males while they neglected and oppressed women. The other verses of the story can also be interpreted in this light, which shifts the message away from homosexuality entirely.

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Tagged: #homosexuality #tradition #shariah

According to the paper Out of Sight and Therefore Out of Mind: Early Sunnī Islamic Modesty Regulations and the Creation of Spheres of Privacy, [^1] the fitna principle was not the primary concern of scholars who sought to regulate women’s dress. Rather, “by regulating physical and visual access to women’s bodies and by restricting the flow of sensitive information about them, Islamic law allowed people (primarily the male members of a woman’s family) to protect and control their social image and public reputation.” This was because:

“In classical Islamic society, as in many other societies, the reputation of a person and his or her family was a valuable and crucial asset in various areas of life. Thus, for example, a person’s reputation would affect his or her ability to forge economic and social relations and would determine a person’s trustworthiness for the purpose of testifying in court. Damage to a person’s good name could result in social ostracism and economic destruction. In early Islamic society, as in later periods, a family’s honor and reputation were linked to, among other things, the chastity of its women.”

The essay points to the fact that slave women were allowed to expose much of their bodies in public spaces because their chastity had no bearing on the reputation of their masters. This is noteworthy since “bodies of slave girls were not, by definition, less arousing than those of free women.”

Aside from challenging the view that women’s bodies are pudendal, hence sexually corrupting to those who see them, this also challenges the common belief that female veiling is obligatory by divine decree, and never up for interpretation. If it is a compulsory act of ʿibādat, why was it dependent on social status?

Historically, modesty regulations were subject to change:

“Moreover, modesty regulations suggest that scholars throughout the classical period were practical, and not completely doctrinaire, in determining what constitutes appropriate exposure of a person. They adjusted the modesty restrictions they imposed in accordance with what their society defined as a) each gender’s daily tasks and b) what constituted normal exposure between men and women.”

So what would Islamic modesty regulations look like today were this process to continue? The emphasis on female veiling would perhaps change significantly in a society which rejects the culture of placing undue focus on the chastity of a woman and linking the reputation of her family to her appearance.

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Tagged: #tradition #women #veiling #modesty

Notes:

[^1]: Alshech, E. (2007). Out of Sight and Therefore Out of Mind: Early Sunnī Islamic Modesty Regulations and the Creation of Spheres of Privacy. Journal of Near Eastern Studies, 66(4), 267-290. doi:10.1086/524180.

“Slave ownership was not only for the filthy rich, though, and the jurists identified with slaveholders rather than with slaves. Some owned at least one enslaved concubine; both Shāfiʿī and Ibn Ḥanbal died leaving concubines who had borne them children (umm walads). One report declares that Mālik ibn Anas “purchased three hundred sarārī [concubines] and would spend one night a year with each of them.” Even if, as is likely, this report exaggerates, it makes clear that concubinage was a normal part of the sociosexual patterns of life in this era, as was domestic servitude more generally. Shāfiʿī – by no means a wealthy man – apparently had in his household two adolescent male slaves as well as an Andalusian wet nurse, who nursed the child born to his slave concubine. Stories about Mālik refer to a black female slave who answered knocks at his gate. In addition to illustrating the widespread nature of slaveholding, these anecdotes help us remember that their own status as slaveholders cannot help but have influenced the jurists’ rulings.”

— Kecia Ali, (Marriage and slavery in early Islam, 2010, p. 22)

The Quran opposes the subjugation of people in plain terms. al-aʿrāf, 7/157 mentions the nabiy who “lift[s] from them their burdens and the shackles that were upon them.” al-nisāa, 4/19 forbids the believers to “inherit the nisā against their will.” al-nisāa, 4/75 says: “And how could you refuse to fight in the cause of God and of the utterly helpless men and women and children who are crying, “O our Sustainer! Lead us forth [to freedom] out of this land whose people are oppressors...”” In spite of this, slavery persisted throughout Islamic history. Dr. Ali also quotes the Hanafi jurist Muhammad ‘Ala al-Din Haskafi saying, “A free man may marry four free women and female slaves, not more, and he may take as many concubines as he wishes from among his female slaves.” (Sexual Ethics and Islam, 2006, p. 39) Haskafi lived in the seventeenth century, which suggests the view of many Muslims today – that Islam came to phase out slavery – wasn’t one shared by the scholars of the past. They were still justifying and regulating the practice hundreds of years after the Prophet passed away.

I do mention this from time to time, but not to hang over the heads of Muslims or to make people uncomfortable. There is no moral justification for sex-slavery, so I think the legitimate status of concubinage in Islam’s past has far reaching consequences for how we view the role of tradition in actualising Islam today. While few Muslims today would condone sex-slavery, many do insist that the role of women must be defined by the same classical sources which allowed concubinage. Pro-concubine rulings of the classical scholars are divorced from their other rulings regarding women, essentially keeping the overall fiqh of women intact.

The problem with this is that the classical scholars would have viewed their legal thinking as unified, each ruling in sync with other rulings, each being in harmony with a wider Islamic ethic. The world-view which informed their views of concubinage also informed their views of hierarchies and women in general. Of course, it’s possible to isolate one particular practice from a tradition and discard it without the whole thing collapsing; the Sunnah didn’t die along with the institution of slavery. But if the classical jurists believed slave women could be used for sex, while free women must be covered from head to toe, it’s reasonable to examine what the relationship between these two rulings are. Did the moral arguments used to arrive at the former feature in the latter? If yes, is the latter morally questionable like the former?

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Tagged: #sunnah #women #tradition #slavery